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Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and 
Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets
* 
 
Employers structure pay and employment relationships to mitigate agency problems. A large 
literature in economics documents how the resolution of these problems shapes personnel 
policies and labor markets. For the most part, the study of agency in employment 
relationships relies on highly stylized assumptions regarding human motivation, e.g., that 
employees seek to earn as much money as possible with minimal effort. In this essay, we 
explore the consequences of introducing behavioral complexity and realism into models of 
agency within organizations. Specifically, we assess the insights gained by allowing 
employees to be guided by such motivations as the desire to compare favorably to others, 
the aspiration to contribute to intrinsically worthwhile goals, and the inclination to reciprocate 
generosity or exact retribution for perceived wrongs. More provocatively, from the standpoint 
of standard economics, we also consider the possibility that people are driven, in ways that 
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1. Introduction
Many of the most widely-discussed and contentious issues facing the U.S. economy con-
cern the use of incentives to solve agency problems. Consider, for example, the problem
of reforming the ¯nancial system following the recent collapse of ¯nancial markets. Ex-
planations for the crash, as well as proposed strategies for e®ective reform, pivot around
the adequacy of high powered ¯nancial incentives for ensuring that CEOs, rating agencies,
¯nancial advisors and brokers act in the interests of their constituents. Similarly, widely
discussed proposals for improving health care quality and reducing costs involve \pay for
performance" programs that reward the provision of \cost e®ective" health care. A growing
literature in the economics of education is also exploring the e±cacy of rewarding teachers
for enhancing student performance.
In these debates, advocates argue that high powered incentives are necessary to get
important work done e±ciently. Thus, even the very large bonuses to top executives and
elite ¯nancial engineers are \worth it" in the sense that expected gains from improved
performance easily exceed the amount paid out. Critics counter that advocates for high
powered incentive systems misunderstand human motivation. High powered incentives are
unnecessary because appropriately motivated, selected and socialized agents will perform
as well or better when stakes are lower. From this perspective incentives are ine±cient
because they generate unnecessary and potentially costly inequality within work groups or
peer groups and because they needlessly divert agents' attention away from valuable aspects
of their jobs that are hard to monitor and reward. In extreme cases, powerful incentives
can cause agents to engage in malfeasance. Even more provocatively, some critics argue
that the provision of extrinsic incentives undermine agents' intrinsic motives and, in this
way, worsen the incentive problem they are designed to solve.
Although advocates and critics may not be aware of it, the public controversies about
incentive pay are essentially disputes about the appropriate speci¯cation of a workhorse
economic model: the principal agent model. In its basic form, this model supports the
idea that extrinsic rewards can be an e±cient means of motivating agents. The claims ofEXTRINSIC REWARDS AND INTRINSIC MOTIVES 3
the critics are supported, however, when more realistic|and ad hoc|behavioral assump-
tions are introduced. Close examination of principal agent models reveals, furthermore,
that debates about agency have implications far beyond issues of optimal incentive design.
Indeed, the strategies ¯rms adopt to resolve agency problems can have profound e®ects on
labor markets broadly, a®ecting gender and racial inequality, labor market segmentation
and unemployment.
In this chapter we review and analyze the principal agent model from a behavioral per-
spective. Although the literature is vast, our task is made simpler by the fact that con-
ventional and behavioral principal agent models share a similar structure. In the simplest
conventional models an agent is assumed to have utility that is increasing in earnings and
decreasing in the provision of e®ort. Given this utility function, the principal can assess
how the agent will react to a given reward structure, and can often link rewards to per-
formance in a way that induces agents to supply e±cient levels of e®ort|even if agents
are entirely self-interested and even if measures of performance are noisy and imperfect.
Behavioral models employ the same structure, but modify the agent's utility function to
include additional psychological factors.
To complicate matters, in applications it is not su±cient to study an isolated agent re-
sponding to the policies of an isolated principal. Agents typically work as part of larger
groups within organizations and society more broadly, and this can have important impli-
cations for the design of reward structures, especially when people have other-regarding
preferences, care about inequality, or belong to groups with established norms of appro-
priate behavior. The policies adopted by ¯rms may also have unexpected e®ects on labor
market outcomes (e.g., can a®ect unemployment rates) and these outcomes may, in turn,
alter the optimal policies of individual ¯rms.
A second complication for conventional principal agent models is that pay structures
often perform \double duty," e.g., they must resolve both a motivation problem and some
other problem. For instance, principals (¯rms) might adopt compensation and employment
practices that signal the principal's ability to make good on promises to agents. Conversely,
employment practices might be designed so as to allow agents to signal some hidden char-
acteristic about themselves, as in \rat race" models in which which individuals provide4 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
\excessive" work hours as a means of signalling an otherwise unobserved personal inclina-
tion to work hard. Pay structure also performs \double duty" when workers must attend
to multiple tasks. In these situations, rewards for high performance along one dimension
draw e®ort and attention away from other valuable dimensions of performance. In turn,
principals must be careful in the assignment of multiple tasks, and might also want to tilt
toward lower-powered incentives.
Just as in conventional principal agent theory, \double duty" incentives play an important
role in behavioral principal agent models. For instance, in behavioral models pay structures
not only elicit e®ort, but also in°uence employee perceptions of the legitimacy of the reward
structure. Indeed, from a behavioral perspective, a key task of management is to persuade
employees of the legitimacy of tasks and rewards and so to help socialize them into the
mutually reinforcing expectations of the group.
Personnel policies also do \double duty" if, as is commonly assumed in behavioral models,
agents have intrinsic motivation. For example, when agents di®er in their intrinsic alignment
with an organization's mission, ¯rms with especially evocative missions may design their
pay structures so as to attract workers who identify with that mission. Signaling variants of
\double duty" incentives are also prevalent in behavioral models of motivation. For example,
¯rms might use compensation policies to signal workers about the likely motivations of co-
workers, which can matter for workers who are inclined to conform to workplace norms.
Signalling might be used also if the ¯rm has hidden knowledge about a worker's suitability
for a task. More provocatively, principals who are sensitive to psychological motivations
might set up compensation policies to exploit the possibility that agents send signals to
themselves, as a means of nurturing a sense of identity.
Our discussion proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present a standard principal agent
model. We begin with the simplest case|a single isolated agent working for an isolated
principal. We then consider the complications that arise when we place this relationship
into the context of a ¯rm or a labor market. As we build our model in this section and
throughout the paper, we refer to relevant empirical applications from experiments and
from ¯eld data.EXTRINSIC REWARDS AND INTRINSIC MOTIVES 5
In Section 3 we introduce the problem of extrinsic rewards with \double duty" incentives.
We discuss three applications: wages as a signal of ¯rm ¯tness, rat races, and multi-tasking.
In each case, the presence of double duty incentives greatly alters the market outcomes and
employment relationships.
In Section 4, we introduce behavioral features to our agency model. To keep the dis-
cussion manageable, we focus on four issues: inequality aversion, the desire to reciprocate,
behavioral norms, and identity/self-image. Many of the interesting applications in this
section focus on professional settings and touch on professional norms.
Section 5 considers behavioral issues in the context of double duty incentives. The most
interesting question we approach here is whether extrinsic rewards might \crowd out" valu-
able intrinsic motivation.
We conclude the paper by highlighting what we see as promising areas for future research.6 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
2. Agency and Extrinsic Rewards
2.1. A Simple Agency Problem
There are a great many interactions in the labor market that can be fruitfully examined
as a principal agent problem|an interaction in which the principal uses a reward structure
to motivate an agent to pursue some desired action. As a baseline example, consider a
principal who seeks to maximize pro¯t, which depends on the \e®ort" of an agent and the
compensation given to that agent, as speci¯ed by
(1) g(e) ¡ w:
In (1), g(e) is the value produced for the principal as a consequence of an agent's e®ort e
(which can be represented as a non-negative scalar) and w is compensation given to the
agent. We assume that that g0(e) > 0 and g00(e) < 0 exist and are continuous. As for the
agent, we assume simply that utility is w ¡ e. Thus e is the money metric disutility of
taking the action that bene¯ts the principal. What makes this problem interesting is that
the principal cannot directly observe e®ort.
Although information asymmetry is essential to our story, to set basic ideas, we ask
initially what the solution would be if the principal could observe the agent's e®ort, and
write a contract specifying e®ort and wage. The ¯rm would then simply maximize (1),
subject to the agent's participation constraint, which speci¯es that the utility resulting
from the agreed-upon wage and e®ort must equal or exceed the utility available to the
agent elsewhere, i.e., w ¡ e ¸ v. The principal ¯nds it most pro¯table to operate with this
latter constraint binding, so it immediately follows that the solution to this constrained
maximization problem entails
(2) g0(e¤) = 1:
This outcome is e±cient: the marginal value of additional e®ort equals the marginal cost to
the worker of supplying the e®ort. This agreed-upon e®ort level is the same as if the agent
worked for herself. The resulting wage is w¤ = v + e¤.
When, instead, the principal does not observe the agent's e®ort level, the principal must
¯nd an incentive mechanism to induce the desired e®ort level. One possibility is that payEXTRINSIC REWARDS AND INTRINSIC MOTIVES 7
can be conditioned on the value of output g(e): In some instances, though, neither output
nor e®ort are readily observable. We consider such a case. We suppose, instead, that the
principal has a noisy signal of e®ort,
(3) x = e + ²;
where ² is drawn from a di®erentiable, symmetric, single-peaked density f (with correspond-
ing cumulative density F). There are variety of possible interpretations consistent with this
set-up. For example, x might be some objective measure of performance, and ² is simply
luck. Alternatively, we might interpret x as a principal's impression or opinion of how well
a worker is performing, so x is unobservable by outside parties. The ² term in this latter
case captures miscommunication and misinterpretation of e®ort.
We start with the case in which the realized value of x is common knowledge, adopting the
assumption that the principal can be trusted to honor commitments in which compensation
w is conditioned on x. In this case, there are many incentive schemes that will do. To set
the stage for results to come, we work through a particularly simple scheme: we assume
that the principal commits to a policy of paying wage w0 if the observed performance x
falls below some cut-o® ¹ x, and paying w1 > w0 if x is above that cut-o®.1
To be clear, we have the following timing in mind: (i) The principal announces the policy
(including ¹ x), and posts w0 and w1. (ii) The agent decides whether to accept the job, and
if she does, takes hidden action e. (iii) Nature plays x: (iv) Given x; the ¯rm pays the
agreed-upon wage.
We can easily solve for the optimal wage policy, (w¤
0;w¤
1). Conceptually, the ¯rst step is
to account for the agent's best response to the wage policy. At e®ort level e, the probability
of earning w0 is F(¹ x ¡ e) and the probability of earning w1 is 1 ¡ F(¹ x ¡ e). So the agent
wants to maximize
(4) w0F(¹ x ¡ e) + w1 [1 ¡ F(¹ x ¡ e)] ¡ e;
1For the moment we take the cut-o® as given, but as will become apparent, in this particular model it is
important that the chosen cut-o® be lower than the hoped-for level of performance, e
¤.8 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
which leads to the best response, ^ e, that solves
(5) (w1 ¡ w0)f(¹ x ¡ ^ e) ¡ 1 = 0:
From this last expression, we notice that the best response is a function of the di®erence
between the higher wage and the lower wage, say b ´ w1 ¡ w0 (b is the \bonus" that
accompanies the high-performance outcome).2 Thus we can write ^ e(b); noting, for future
reference that
(6) ^ e0(b) = f(¹ x ¡ ^ e)=[bf0(¹ x ¡ ^ e)] > 0
(under the assumption that the second order condition holds). This makes sense; higher-
powered incentives elicit greater e®ort.
Next, the principal must account for a participation constraint. The agent accepts the
job only if the expected wage equals or exceeds the agent's opportunity cost:
(7) w0F(¹ x ¡ e) + w1 [1 ¡ F(¹ x ¡ e)] ¸ v + ^ e(b):
The principal's problem then turns out to be straightforward. Expected pro¯t is output
minus the expected wage, and given that the participation constraint binds, this is just
(8) g(^ e(b)) ¡ [v + ^ e(b)]:
The ¯rst order condition to the principal's pro¯t maximization problem is
(9) [g0(^ e(b¤)) ¡ 1]^ e0(b¤) = 0:
Above, we noted that ^ e0(b) > 0 for any best response, so the elicited e®ort level, e¤ ´ ^ e(b¤),
described by (9) solves
(10) g0(e¤) = 1:
The solution thus entails the e±cient level of e®ort, as in (2). The principal pins down
b¤ using (5), which can be read as giving b¤ as an implicit function of e¤. Finally, given
b¤ and e¤, the ¯rm sets the base wage w¤
0 to be as low as possible, while still meeting the
participation constraint (7).
2The second order condition is ¡bf
0(¹ x ¡ ^ e) < 0; which is satis¯ed if ^ e exceeds the cut-o® ¹ x. Hence our
observation in the previous footnote that ¹ x must be below the hoped-for level of e®ort.EXTRINSIC REWARDS AND INTRINSIC MOTIVES 9
We have obviously chosen to work out an extremely simple case as our prototypical
principal-agent model.3 As simple as the model is, it is nevertheless su±cient to make
the point that a solution to the agency problem entails a strategy of conditioning pay on
observed productivity. This reward structure can elicit e±cient e®ort levels even when
agents are entirely self-interested and when performance measures are noisy and imperfect.
2.2. Agency Matters
In this section we demonstrate the value of thinking carefully about agency in the context
of three labor market applications: (i) CEO compensation, a case in which there is a single
agent, (ii) personnel policies in a ¯rm, which involves a single principal seeking to motivate
multiple agents, and (iii) unemployment and labor market segmentation that can arise in
labor markets in which multiple principals compete for agents, and in which the motivation
problem is addressed by the threat of dismissal. In each of these three cases, solutions to the
principal agent problem are seen to have important social consequences. In each case also,
empirical evidence indicates that anomalies exist that point to the importance of behavioral
aspects that are not included in the standard principal agent set-up.
2.2.1. CEO Compensation
In advanced economies with modern ¯nancial systems, top executives of publicly traded
corporations and large ¯nancial ¯rms play a central role in the allocation of productive
resources. Thus the reward structure under which these executives operate is of considerable
economic interest. The rapid increase in the pay of CEOs since the early 1980s is also one
of the most striking labor market developments of the past 25 years. These pay increases
have contributed in an important way to growing income inequality (Levy and Temin,
2007) and they have also been the target of intense public controversy. The rise in CEO
compensation is inextricably linked to agency issues because most of the changes in pay are
the result of increasing grants of stocks and stock options. For example, Hall and Liebman
(1998) report the median elasticity of CEO compensation with respect to ¯rm stock market
performance more than tripled between 1980 and 1994, largely because of the rapid rise in
stock based compensation. Bebchuck and Grinstein (2005) document a continuing rapid
growth in equity-based compensation for CEOs and top ¯ve executives through 2003.
3Natural alternative conceptions would allow for risk aversion, as in the HolmstrÄ om's (1979) classic paper.10 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
One of the great appeals of the principal agent model is that it tells us what e±cient
CEO reward structures ought to look like. A central prediction of the model is that the
e±cient reward structure for CEOs and other top executives should have higher levels of
expected pay and higher incentive intensity than for other employees. As a simple formal
example, suppose that the value to a ¯rm of a particular agent's e®ort is g(e) = µh(e); where
h(e) is a concave function increasing in e; and µ is a positive constant that di®ers across
individuals within an organization, depending on the importance of that individual's job
to the organization's pro¯tability. CEOs and top executives will typically have the highest
values of µ. At the e±cient level of e®ort, µh0(e¤) = 1 and µh00(e¤) < 0 (assuming that the
second order condition holds), so de¤
dµ =
¡h0(e¤)
µh00(e¤) > 0. Thus e®ort expectations are highest
for CEOs and top executives and, because the agent's \best response" e®ort is increasing
in the size of the bonus, b will also be highest for them. The size of the bonus, b, is likely
to be very large, particularly in an environment in which it is di±cult to assess the CEO's
absolute performance.
One way of expressing the agency model presented above is that compensation should be
set so that any agent becomes (at the margin and in expected value) the residual claimant
with respect to her contributions to the ¯rm; her own personal fortune rises or falls as a
consequence of the value of the actions she undertakes on behalf of her ¯rm, g(e). Now in
our set-up above, the ¯rm conditions compensation on an imperfect measure of e, under an
assumption about the infeasibility of measuring g(e) itself for a typical employee. But in
the case of the CEO, her actions might be so consequential to the ¯rm that her contribution
essentially represents ¯rm pro¯t itself. If so, perhaps the ideal contract would make her,
roughly, the residual claimant to the entire corporation. To make that happen, one would
want to tie CEO compensation tightly to ¯rm pro¯tability (i.e., stock values) and then give
the CEO unlimited latitude with regard to actions she takes on behalf of the ¯rm.
At ¯rst blush, incentives for CEOs appear to match well the predictions of the bare
bones principal agent model. Top executives earn multi-million dollar salaries and the bulk
of their compensation comes in the form of pay linked to stock-based performance measures,
as one would expect if stock markets are e±cient evaluators of ¯rm value. Indeed, empirical
analysis by Gayle and Miller (2009) indicates that the pattern of rising CEO pay and theEXTRINSIC REWARDS AND INTRINSIC MOTIVES 11
rising incentive intensity of this pay over a sixty year period can be explained largely by
parameters emphasized in the principal agent model: increasing losses to the ¯rm from
CEOs pursuing their own goals rather than value maximization, and the deteriorating
value of stock performance as a signal of CEO e®ort. The former is the result largely of the
increasing size of ¯rms.
While it is clear that CEOs ought to function under higher-powered incentives than other
employees, it is not clear if compensation boards are setting incentives properly. In their
seminal article, \Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Jensen and Murphy
(1990) estimate that during the period 1969 through 1983, CEO wealth increased by only
$3.25 in response to a $1000 increase in ¯rm value. This number would seem to o®er a prima
facia case for CEOs having inadequate incentives to increase shareholder value. Hall and
Liebman (1998) present empirical evidence that in fact there is a substantially tighter link
between CEO compensation and ¯rm value, particularly when they examine more recent
periods (1980-1994).4
Still, in large corporations CEOs are far from being residual claimants. As Hall and
Liebman (1998) suggest, this might pose little problem for the proper alignment of some
CEO actions but create large problems for others. For example, a CEO who receives $1
in compensation per $100 value created for a ¯rm might be su±ciently motivated to make
smart, carefully-reasoned decisions about resource allocation to proposed projects. But this
same CEO gets an e®ective 99% discount on a multi-million jet purchased by the ¯rm for
his own use.
This latter point is easily illustrated with a slight modi¯cation to our baseline principal
agent model. Suppose, now, that ¯rm pro¯t is
(11) g(e) ¡ wS ¡ wN;
where now wS is the CEO's salary and wN is the non-salary cost that results from the CEO's
actions that increase the CEO's welfare at the expense of the ¯rm (e.g., expenditures on a
4In particular, they estimate that during the period 1980{1994 a typical CEO whose actions caused the
¯rm to move from the 30th percentile of annual returns to the 70th percentile enjoyed an increase in annual
compensation of 1 to 4 million dollars (1994 dollars), mostly through the increased value of the CEO's stocks
and stock options. For stellar performance the increase in CEO wealth was estimated to be much higher.12 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
jet for CEO use). We now let the CEO's utility be wS + u(wN) ¡ e; where u(wN) is the
money metric value to the CEO of non-salary expenditures|a function that is obviously
increasing in wN. We also expect u0(0) > 1 and u00(wN) < 0.5 If the ¯rm could observe and
direct e and wN; it would choose e¤ and w¤
N so that
(12) g0(e¤) = 1 and u0(w¤
N) = 1:
Suppose instead the ¯rm sets the variable component of the CEO's compensation equal to
the share s of the ¯rm's pro¯t, i.e., s[g(e) ¡ wN]. The best response here will entail the
CEO choosing
(13) g0(e¤¤) = 1=s and u0(w¤¤
N ) = s:
Comparison of (12) and (13) demonstrates the problem: If s < 1; we have too little CEO
e®ort on behalf of the ¯rm and too much squandering of resources on the CEO.
How should the corporation's compensation board respond? One argument is that s must
be driven ever closer to 1, even if this entails a substantial direct surplus transfer to the CEO.
An alternative might entail the judicious combination of monitoring and more-narrowly
directed incentives|a process that would likely play on the hope that hard-to-observe
excessive levels of wN by the CEO would be limited by shame or a sense of obligation to
shareholders. This latter strategy can only be studied in a set-up that takes such behavioral
aspects into account.
In any event, it is infeasible for ¯rms to set up pay structures in which CEOs literally
become residual claimants. The issue at hand is readily visible in our baseline principal
agent model. As we note above, if it is optimal to induce a CEO to exert a very high level
of e®ort on behalf of the ¯rm, it is necessary also to have a very high bonus. With a binding
participation constraint, this means that the contract will specify negative base pay. If this
is infeasible, i.e., if the CEO cannot be compelled to pay the ¯rm when performance is poor,
it will be necessary to modify the contract to take account of the CEO's limited liability.
A simple solution to compensation with limited liability might look like this: each year
the CEO is o®ered high pay and is rewarded further by having her contract renewed for the
5Concavity is natural here. The assumption u
0(0) > 1 simply allows for the fact that some expenditures
on CEO wellbeing are e±cient.EXTRINSIC REWARDS AND INTRINSIC MOTIVES 13
following year if she has a high observed performance level, but she is dismissed if observed
performance is insu±ciently high. We characterize this solution in detail in Section 2.2.3
below. Two key results that emerge in that analysis are germane here. First, the solution
entails a surplus transfer from the ¯rm to the CEO; the necessity of having a high-powered
incentive leads to an especially high salary for the CEO when there is limited liability.
Second, the more precise the principal is in assessing performance, the lower will be this
surplus transfer.6
Our baseline principal agent model therefore predicts that pro¯t-maximizing principals
will, whenever possible, seek to reward performance and not luck.7 There is persuasive
evidence that, to the contrary, at least some CEOs are rewarded for observable luck. In
particular, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) show that because of the way many ¯rms
tie CEO compensation to stock market performance, \CEO pay in fact responds as much
to a lucky dollar as to a general dollar." For example, increases in the world price of oil
causes stock price increases in the oil industry. In the baseline principal agent model, such
\luck" should have no impact on CEO pay, but in reality some CEOs are observed to reap
handsome rewards simply because of such luck.
The use of high-intensity incentives through the use of stock options|a common way of
tying compensation and ¯rm outcomes|can create additional problems. If options are very
far under water, their value as incentives degrades to near zero|obviously an undesirable
state of a®airs.8 Conversely, when stock prices are just below the stock price, the payo®
to even small increases in the stock price are huge, and this can create irresistible tempta-
tions to game the compensation system. Heron and Lie (2009), for example, estimate that
13.6% of all option grants to top executives during the period 1996-2005 were backdated or
otherwise manipulated.
6We prove this latter result formally in Section 2.2.3 for the important case in which there is an ongoing
(multiple period) relationship between the principal (¯rm) and agent (CEO).
7Notice that this result holds even though we assume that agents are risk neutral. The result is reinforced,
of course, if the agent is risk averse.
8Hall and Knox (2004) estimate that at the height of the bull market in 1999, roughly a third of executive
options were under water. Companies often respond to this non-linearity in stock option returns by increasing
option grants following stock price declines.14 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
It is especially surprising that the use of stock options is a part of compensation even
for many corporate employees below the top executive level. Hall and Murphy (2003)
report that in S&P 500 corporations, roughly 90% of the outstanding options are granted to
employees below the top ¯ve executives. This pattern is very hard to reconcile with principal
agent models because the e®orts of individual employees below the top ¯ve executives, it
would seem, can have little direct in°uence on the price at which their company's stock
trades. In this case, a stock-based compensation of any sort is likely to have little e®ect on
e®ort levels. The use of stock-based compensation for lower-level employees is even harder
to understand if agents are risk averse. Here again, the simple principal agent model appears
to be inadequate for explaining compensation practices, perhaps because of the omission of
important behavioral aspects.
2.2.2. Personnel Policies
There have been a great many applications of the principal-agent model for the purpose
of understanding compensation policies within ¯rms more broadly. As a simple example,
consider a pro¯t-maximizing employer whose n workers produce output according to a
production function, Y = G(e1;e2;:::;en) per period, where ei is worker i's e®ort. As
above, output is increasing in e®ort: @G=@ei > 0.
We continue to assume also that in a given period a worker chooses e and receives utility
w¡e; and that the ¯rm cannot condition compensation on Y (or, in any event chooses not
to). Importantly, for this application, we also assume that workers do not base their e®ort
decisions on the e®ort or compensation of other workers.9 Then we can treat the ¯rm's
agency problem with a given worker in terms of the function g(ei); which is the value of
product that results from production G(ei;e(¡i)); where e(¡i) denotes e®ort levels of workers
other than i. We assume that g0(ei) and g00(ei) are continuous, and that g00(ei) < 0.
In setting up our baseline agency model in Section 2.1 we ignored an issue that is generally
germane in the workplace: The indicator of performance, x in our model, is typically
observed only by the manager and by workers within a ¯rm, and thus cannot readily be
used as the basis for forming contracts that can be enforced, say, by an outside court.
9This last assumption follows naturally enough, given the utility function we have speci¯ed. In our
discussion of behavioral models in Section 4, we allow for the possibility that workers do care directly about
the e®ort or compensation of other workers.EXTRINSIC REWARDS AND INTRINSIC MOTIVES 15
Workers who understand that they will have no recourse if a manager violates the implicit
agreement|\pay a bonus for high observed e®ort"|will logically decline to accept the
proposed agreement. How might a ¯rm proceed in this case? One possibility is to set up
a competition among it's n workers. Suppose, for example, that the ¯rm cannot directly
condition pay on x, but can commit to an evaluation process at the end of the period
in which (i) workers are ordered on the basis of observed performance, and then (ii) the
fraction P who are lowest-performing are paid w0; while the remaining high-performing
workers are paid w1 > w0: The key idea here is that while individual performance is not
well observed, everyone can observe the agreed-upon reward structure and see if the ¯rm is
meeting that obligation.
We can easily ¯nd a Bayesian equilibrium the which all workers supply the same level of
e®ort in response to the competition. Suppose that worker i believes that all other workers
are going to play ~ e(¡i): Now what is her best response? The worker ¯rst uses her knowledge
of P to accurately assess the cut-o® value of observed performance, say ~ x; which separates
low- and high-performance assessments. That is, she takes note of the value ~ x that solves
F(~ x ¡ ~ e(¡i)) = P: Given that value ~ x; her optimal choice is to set e®ort level ei so as to
maximize
(14) w0F(~ x ¡ ei) + w1
£
1 ¡ F(~ x ¡ ei)
¤
¡ e;
which leads to a best response given by
(15) (w1 ¡ w0)f(~ x ¡ ^ ei) ¡ 1 = 0:
But this is exactly the worker best response we solved in our baseline example (compare (5)
and (15)). Given this insight, it is easy to verify that the ¯rm has a workable plan here: The
¯rm starts by setting the \tournament prizes," (w0; w1), to be (w¤
0, w¤
1), as derived in our
baseline example in Section 2.1. Then it chooses the fraction P¤ so that P¤w¤
0 +(1¡P¤)w¤
1
just satis¯es the participation constraint (5). If worker i believes other workers are choosing
e®ort level ~ e(¡i) = e¤; she responds by also choosing e¤. All workers behave the same in
equilibrium.10
10It is important here that the manager actually follows through on the promise to award the higher wage
to workers who have the highest realized values of x. This might be sensible, especially if realized values of16 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
The logic outlined in the preceding paragraph is the starting point of Malcomson's (1984)
well-known paper on hierarchy and internal labor markets. He suggests that the \tourna-
ment prize" idea can be fruitful for thinking about the internal organization of the work-
place. He works with a two-period model. In the ¯rst period of one's career, within a ¯rm,
each worker receives the same wage.
11 Then in the second period, the fraction (1 ¡ P) of
workers who have been most successful as junior employees are promoted to high-paying
jobs, while the fraction P who have been less successful are retained in low-paying jobs (at
a wage that is high enough to keep them from moving to other ¯rms). The tournament
provides an extrinsic reward designed to elicit optimal e®ort from young workers.12
As Malcomson (1984) notes, the simple tournament model we have just outlined is con-
sistent with some commonly observed features of organizations, e.g., that wage structures
in organizations are often \hierarchical," with workers falling into distinct pay grades, that
often workers in high-paid positions are promoted from within, that wages typically rise
with seniority (perhaps by more than productivity), and that the variance of wages in-
creases with seniority. Indeed, one of the major contributions of agency theory to labor
economics is it's ability to help explain the origin of ¯rm wage policies and hence clarify
the contribution that personnel practices make to shaping the wage structure.13
As was true in its application to CEO compensation, the ¯rst-order predictions of the
agency model receive considerable empirical support, but there are anomalies that suggest
the model may not o®er an altogether satisfactory guide to understanding the internal
structure of organizations.
To begin, it is important to recognize that extrinsic incentives do matter within organiza-
tions, often in exactly the way predicted by simple models of agency: Lazear (2000) found
an increase in e®ort when a glass installer went from ¯xed pay to pay-for-performance.
x are reasonably well known by people within the ¯rm. After all, why wouldn't the manager want to reward
to workers who have the highest performance outcomes? Having said that, if there is \favoritism" based on
other criteria, the proposed incentive plan falls apart.
11This wage solves a two-period participation constraint. The ¯rst period wage is low, possibly negative.
12In Malcomson's (1984) set-up, the agency problem is left unresolved for older workers. The point is that
young workers can be motivated by the promise of future prizes (promotions, raises, etc.). Such incentives
are less likely to be e®ective for workers nearing retirement. This is quite typical in agency-based models of
\internal labor markets," and it doesn't substantially alter the basic insights generated in these models.
13There are now a number of insightful overviews of the topic, including Lazear (1998), Prendergast
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Kahn and Sherer (1990) document the e®ectiveness of an evaluation-and-bonus program at
a manufacturing ¯rm. Jacob (2005) shows that high-stakes testing in the Chicago Public
Schools does alter teacher behavior|intensifying e®ort in improving student's test-speci¯c
skills, while substituting away from low-stakes subjects like science and social studies. Im-
portant work by Theodore Groves and John McMillan and their co-authors shows that
strengthened incentives led to substantial productivity increases in Chinese industry and
agriculture.14 And, of course, there are many other examples in the literature.
Principal agent models also require that ¯rms are choosing pay policies in an optimal way.
It is hard to ¯nd direct evidence that pay policies are chosen in this way. Indeed, much of the
literature showing that \incentives work" does so by exploiting the measured consequences
of poorly designed incentives. That is, they clearly demonstrate that organizations|at least
in some cases|do not choose incentives optimally. This is clear, for example, in Oyer's
(1998) work, which calls attention to the fact that salespeople seem to intensify e®ort at
the end of the ¯scal year if by doing so they can surpass performance thresholds and earn a
bonus. At the organizational level, Courty and Marschke (2004) similarly demonstrate that
a large government organization strategically reported performance outcomes to increase
earned rewards, and did so at the expense of productive activities. In work with Martin
Gaynor (Gaynor, Rebitzer and Taylor, 2004), we document the e®ects of an HMO's incentive
contract designed to limit expenditures by physicians, but our identi¯cation strategy relies
on the observation that a key feature of the incentive contract was implemented haphazardly.
An even more extreme example is Jacob and Levitt's (2003) demonstration that public
school teachers responded to a shift toward higher-powered incentives by cheating, e.g., by
altering questions on standardized tests taken by students.
Some of the ancillary predictions of principal agent models also lack empirical support. In
the two period model we present above, compensation in period 1 ought to move inversely
to expected compensation in period 2|a result that follows directly from a two-period
participation constraint. In an earlier paper studying law ¯rms (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995a)
we tested this hypothesis. We ¯nd, contrary to the predictions of our principal agent
model, that large law ¯rms with extremely high second period compensation (in the form
14See, e.g., McMillan, et al. (1989), Groves, et al. (1994), and Groves, et al. (1995).18 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
of the high income of partnership) also pay their starting associates high salaries relative to
smaller ¯rms. This would seem to indicate that successful law ¯rms use some form of \rent
sharing"|a strategy that emerges when we add such behavioral features as \inequality
aversion" (in Section 4.1).
A particularly jarring feature of the minimalist agency model of personnel practices is
the \irrelevance of ex post inequality." The compensation structure emerging from our
model might indeed be termed \pay for luck" rather than \pay for performance." The
principal and agent(s) know that the equilibrium e®ort level is e¤. Even so, it is important
that pay be based on the measure of observed performance so as to provide the crucial
extrinsic incentives. This feature|that rewards or punishments are based on an observed
outcome, not on the actual behavior (even though those behaviors can be deduced)|is
very common in game-theoretic approaches, including much of the work presented below.
Anybody who has spoken with managers (or chaired an academic department) knows that
people don't respond well when they are paid less than co-workers for what appears to be
arbitrary, capricious or random reasons. This observation has been widely examined in the
behavioral literature on agency, and we will discuss it's implications in Section 4.
2.2.3. Involuntary Unemployment and Market Segmentation
In 1984, Shapiro and Stiglitz set out an in°uential \e±ciency wage" model that illustrates
an important feature of agency models: the actions an individual ¯rm takes to resolve an
agency problem can give rise to important social costs when adopted throughout the market.
In the case of e±ciency wage models, the social costs are those arising from involuntary
unemployment and labor market segmentation.15 The set-up we present here is a recasting
of the Shapiro and Stiglitz model taken from Ritter and Taylor (forthcoming).
We consider a market in which there are a large number of identical pro¯t-maximizing
employers, each of which faces the agency problem we outlined above. Each ¯rm in the
model is assumed to behave as outlined in Section 2.1: the idea is to pay well for \good
outcomes" while penalizing workers for \bad outcomes" to the maximum extent possible.
Limited liability is invoked through the assumption that the only penalty that the ¯rm can
implement is to dismiss a poorly performing worker. The motivation problem is resolved by
15Similar points were also made in the important work of Bowles (1985).EXTRINSIC REWARDS AND INTRINSIC MOTIVES 19
employers making jobs su±ciently valuable that workers will provide e®ort so as to prevent
dismissal.
To capture the idea that jobs have value, it is necessary to set the model up in a multi-
period framework. The agency model outlined in Section 2.1 is thus assumed to pertain for
each period inde¯nitely and workers are assumed to live inde¯nitely with a discount rate
½.16
The Basic Set-Up
Employees are paid w for one unit of labor per period. In each period a worker chooses e,
and this produces utility w ¡e. In this model, the alternative to employment is unemploy-
ment, which results in utility v = 0 in the period. The present value of being unemployed
is V u (which is not 0 because there is some prospect of being hired in the future). Hiring
and termination are costless to the ¯rm.
The model is a game between the ¯rm and a worker with the following order of play in
each round: (1) The ¯rm o®ers a wage w. (2) The worker chooses e®ort level e. (3) Nature
plays x using the distribution f( ). (4) The ¯rm pays w. (5) The ¯rm decides whether to
retain the worker or end the game. We focus on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which
the worker is retained if and only if x exceeds an endogenous threshold ¹ x. We assume that
¹ x is common knowledge. (Workers can infer ¹ x by observing the frequency of terminations.)
The solution method mimics the steps we took in the simpler model above. In particular,
we ¯rst ¯nd the worker's best response. Then we see how the ¯rm will chose it's personnel
policies (¹ x and w) in light of the worker's best response.
The Worker's Best Response
Let ^ e(w; ¹ x) be the worker's best response. To ¯nd that best response notice that for a
person who chooses e in the current period, and then reverts to ^ e in all future periods,
lifetime utility is given by
(16) V (e) = w ¡ e +
£
F(¹ x ¡ e)V u +
¡






16Valuable long-term employment relationships are central to these models, and thus so are shocks to em-
ployment. The model here can be enriched to allow for these exogenous shocks to employment relationships,
but for simplicity we omit this feature.20 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
The employee maximizes V (e) by choosing ^ e > 0. For an interior solution, the ¯rst order
condition is
(17)
[V (^ e) ¡ V u]
1 + ½
f(¹ x ¡ ^ e) ¡ 1 = 0:
As in our baseline agency model, the second order condition holds when f0(¹ x ¡ e) > 0. As
we have noted, this incentive elicits e®ort because the job is valuable: [V (^ e) ¡ V u] > 0: As
is typical of models that invoke limited liability, the participation constraint does not bind.
Evaluating equation (16) at e = ^ e and solving for V (^ e), then substituting into the ¯rst
order condition (17) produces




½ + F(¹ x ¡ ^ e)
f(¹ x ¡ ^ e)
:
This last expression implicitly de¯nes the worker's best response, ^ e(w; ¹ x).
Firm Pro¯t Maximization
Now we can turn to the ¯rm's objective. It seeks to maximize pro¯ts, taking into account
the worker's best response, i.e., maximizes
g(^ e(w; ¹ x)) ¡ w:
The solution can readily be found using the same steps we followed in solving the agency
problem in Section 2.1. In this instance the optimal employment policy again induces the
socially optimal performance level regardless of f( ):17
g0(e¤) = 1:
The noise in the environment does, however, a®ect the distribution of surplus. In partic-
ular, Ritter and Taylor (forthcoming) establish the following results: First, when the ¯rm
optimally chooses w and ¹ x, the resulting probability of retention, F(¹ x¤ ¡ ^ e¤), is una®ected
by the level of ¾2 (the variance of the density f( )).18 Second, the optimal wage does depend
17This shows that e±ciency wage motivation can lead to socially optimal e®ort levels, but this need not
always be the case. For example, Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002) show that there can be distortions away
from the socially optimal e®ort level when the principal has discretion over investments in monitoring.
18In fact, the probability of retention is shown to be F
¤ =
Á(z¤)2
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on ¾2; as follows:







where z¤ is a \standardized" random variable, z¤ = (¹ x¤¡e¤)=¾, and Á( ) is the \standardized
p.d.f.," i.e., the p.d.f. of ²
¾. The more intractable the agency problem|the greater the value
of ¾|the higher is the wage required to achieve e±cient e®ort and so the greater the surplus
accruing to the worker.
Equilibrium Unemployment
The equilibrium of the model we have just outlined generates unemployment.
Let V ¤ be the present value of lifetime utility of an employed individual who works at the
optimal e®ort level. Recall that V u is the expected lifetime utility for an individual who is
unemployed. This utility level depends, clearly, on the probability of job acquisition. Let
that rate be a.19 Given that current-period utility of an unemployment person is zero, the
expected lifetime utility of an unemployed individual is
(20) V u = 0 +
£
aV ¤ + (1 ¡ a)V u¤
1 + ½
;
so in turn we can use (17) and (20) to solve for V u and substitute into equation (19), giving









Equation (21) gives the locus of potential equilibrium values of w and a:
Now job loss among the employed occurs with probability F¤ ´ F(¹ x¤;e¤); while job
¯nding among the unemployed occurs with probability a. So if u is the steady state unem-
ployment rate, we must have (1¡u)F¤ = ua. Solving for a and substituting into (21), and
substituting also for F¤ using footnote 18, gives









This expression shows potential equilibrium wage and unemployment levels for the labor
market.
19Note that the rate a is a known constant to any individual, but of course is endogenous to the economy
as a whole. We solve for the equilibrium rate a shortly.22 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
Figure 1 shows the market equilibrium when long-run labor demand is perfectly elastic,
at wE: (More general formulations are easily handled.) Equilibrium unemployment, uE;
solves









Clearly uE > 0. Also, inspection of (23) shows that an increase in ¾ increases unemploy-
ment. This outcome is intuitive. The weaker the link between the dismissal threat and
employee behaviors, the stronger are the incentives required to elicit the desired e®ort level.
In equilibrium, heightened incentives require higher unemployment.
This model of equilibrium unemployment|the Shapiro-Stiglitz model|has emerged as
a workhorse for the analysis of macro-labor issues. It has proved to be useful also for
evaluating policies like unemployment bene¯ts, the public interest in regulating ¯rms' layo®
decisions (i.e., just-cause dismissal requirements, as discussed in Levine, 1991), and the
potential of minimum wage policy to actually increase employment (Rebitzer and Taylor,
1995c). Having said this, economists are divided on the extent to which e±ciency wages
are an important source of equilibrium unemployment. Other forces, like labor market
frictions, matter as well in determining equilibrium unemployment rates.20 E±ciency wages
are clearly not the whole story.
Labor Market Segmentation
Although we have focused on unemployment, the lost output from unemployment may
not capture the full social costs of e±ciency wage personnel policies. After all, if there
are some jobs in the labor market where agency issues are of little importance, workers
should generally be able to ¯nd jobs there. From an e±ciency perspective, ¯nding work
in these \secondary jobs" is similar to unemployment in that individuals in the secondary
labor market would prefer higher-productivity \primary jobs," but the equilibrium supply
of quali¯ed workers for these jobs exceeds the demand.
20Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2007) o®er a review and discussion of models of unemployment
resulting from search frictions. Search models produce both unemployment and wage dispersion, but search
frictions su±cient to account for equilibrium unemployment imply far less wage inequality than is actually
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Labor market segmentation emerges if we enrich our e±ciency wage model by allowing
the di±culty of agency problems to vary across ¯rms. Recall from (21), that in the Ritter-
Taylor version of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model ¯rms choose to pay
(24) w = A + B¾;
where A and B are positive constants that are independent of ¾. Firms that have low values
of ¾; i.e., who have production processes with accurate measures of worker e®ort, can pay
wages that are relatively low. On the other hand, ¯rms will choose to set wages high when
e®ort is hard monitor or, equivalently, when they face high values of ¾:
This latter observation was emphasized in Bulow and Summers' (1986) paper on \dual
labor markets." In their conception, ¯rms with severe agency problems pay high wages and
are said to belong in the primary sector. The strategy of paying high wages is e®ective
because workers are motivated by the prospect of retaining valuable jobs. Thus we also
expect to observe low levels of voluntary exit from such ¯rms and e®orts on the part of
¯rms to retain workers even in a down-turn. In contrast to the primary sector, ¯rms that
have modest agency problems can pay wages that are close to the market-clearing level.
These secondary sector ¯rms will be less concerned about worker turnover. In an extension
of this argument (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1991) we show that ¯rms which employ e±ciency
wages as a motivating device will also be led to hoard labor, i.e., employ labor above the
value-of-marginal-product curve. By taking actions to ensure future employment|perhaps
by hiring contingent workers to absorb demand shocks|¯rms can reduce the wage needed
to provide optimal motivation to workers.
The most widely examined empirical prediction of e±ciency wage models of labor market
segmentation is that there will be cross-¯rm and cross-industry wage variation resulting from
¯rm characteristics, rather than worker characteristics. There is considerable evidence for
industry and ¯rm wage e®ects (including well-known work by Krueger and Summers, 1988,
on industry e®ects, and Brown and Medo®, 1989, on ¯rm size e®ects) but it is often unclear
how much this is due to factors emphasized in e±ciency wage models (such as monitoring
di±culties) or other market imperfections such as those emerging from search frictions (e.g.,
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One potentially helpful approach entails the study of speci¯c ¯rms and industries, with
an eye toward the central predictions of the model. Thus, Cappelli and Chauvin (1991)
examined worker performance across plants within the same ¯rm, examining the extent to
which workers seem to choose performance on the basis of the value of their job relative
to other opportunities in their local labor market. They ¯nd evidence that is generally
supportive of the e±ciency wage set-up. Similarly, in work with Daniel Nagin and Seth
Sanders (Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders, and Taylor, 2002), we evaluated a ¯eld experiment in
which a ¯rm manipulated monitoring rates across several work sites. Consistent with the
e®ort-regulation model set up above, there was substantially more malfeasance in locations
with low monitoring levels.
At the broadest level, the e±ciency wage literature points to important social costs that
emerge as a result of the strategies individual ¯rms use to resolve agency problems. If
¯rms indeed rely on the the fear of job loss to motivate employees, labor markets can
be expected to waste human capital on a large scale through involuntary unemployment
and labor market segmentation. If, however, other motivators can be mobilized to resolve
agency problems, the situation may not be so grim. The costs of agency problems might
be further reduced if schools can socialize children to be especially responsive to these
alternative motivators. Indeed, some have speculated that such socialization may be the
source of much of the social and private returns to investments in human capital. We
take up some of these alternative motivators in Section 4 below. Before turning to these,
however, we must ¯rst introduce another conceptual building block that is important for
our story|incentives that are intended to work along more than one dimension.
3. Extrinsic Rewards and Dual-Purpose Incentives
In real-world applications, compensation policies are often asked to do \double duty." A
well known and intuitive example of this is Lazear's (2000) study of compensation practices
at Safelite, a windshield installation company. As might be expected from the basic principal
agent model, the introduction of an explicit piece rate system induced many workers to
perform at a higher intensity level. In addition, the piece rate system had a selection e®ect:
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work left the ¯rm while, at the same time, the ¯rm was able to attract workers drawn to
the income-e®ort tradeo®s inherent in the piece rate system. In this case, incentive pay was
serving a dual role: motivating and attracting employees.
At Safelite, the selection reinforced the e®ect of incentives on work e®ort. In many
cases, however, there is a tension between the multiple e®ects of incentive pay, and thus
employers must make compromises along one dimension in order to accomplish an objective
along a second dimension. In the following three sub-sections we give examples of this
phenomena and illustrate how the introduction of double duty incentives helps address well
known anomalies. The discussion in this section also sets up of the discussion of behavioral
models that follow. The special problems posed by dual purpose extrinsic incentives can
be either ameliorated or sharpened by behavioral factors of the sort discussed in Section 4.
In addition, dual purpose incentives play a key role in the models of intrinsic motivation
presented in Section 5.
3.1. High Wages as a Signal of Firm Fitness
We begin by discussing a theoretical issue that is well known in the literature on e±ciency
wages. As we have seen, ¯rms that pay e±ciency wages must set wages above the market
clearing level to elicit the desired level of e®ort. E®ort can, however, be elicited more cheaply
by a deferred compensation policy that causes employees to, in e®ect, post a performance
bond. By judiciously back-loading pay, ¯rms can create powerful work incentives while
choosing a wage path whose discounted present value is equal to the market clearing wage.
With this option available, why would employers ever select a more costly e±ciency wage
strategy? The practical relevance of this theoretical puzzle is sharpened by empirical work
suggesting that even when very large amounts of deferred compensation were available, as
is the case in the promotion from associate to partner in large corporate law ¯rms, ¯rms set
wages as if they were pursuing an e±ciency wage strategy (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995a).
Ritter and Taylor (1994) tackled this issue by observing that for both e±ciency wages
and the performance-bond incentive, the power to shape behavior depends on the likelihood
that the ¯rm will honor its future commitments to employees. All else equal, ¯rms will more
e®ectively solve agency problems if employees expect them to be highly reliable in honoring
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Ritter and Taylor build upon this insight by positing a market in which there are two types
of ¯rms: highly reliable ¯rms (i.e., ¯rms that are unlikely to go bankrupt or otherwise renege
on commitments) and less reliable ¯rms (¯rms that are more likely to become bankrupt or
renege). Reliability is known by the ¯rms but not by anyone else, though the distribution of
types is common knowledge. Firms would like to resolve their agency problem as cheaply as
possible, and are inclined to do so by asking workers to post bonds in the form of deferred
compensation. The posted bond is forfeited if the worker is judged to be working at a sub-
standard e®ort level but is returned, with interest, if the worker's observed performance
meets the expected standard.
Under some conditions, all ¯rms pursue the same deferred compensation strategy. In
this pooling equilibrium, workers will require a rate of return on their bonds that re°ects
the aggregate level of riskiness, based on the market-wide probability a ¯rm will fail and be
unable to return the bond.21 This, of course, is a good deal for low-reliability ¯rms|who
bene¯t by paying a below-market interest rate on the bonds that workers have posted|but
a bad deal for high-reliability ¯rms. A more interesting possibility is that e±ciency wage
strategies might emerge for some ¯rms as a separating equilibrium. In this equilibrium, a
reliable ¯rm that deviates from the bonding strategy|by paying a high wage up front|
o®ers a credible signal that it is a highly desirable counterparty for long-term relationships.
If the o®ered wage is su±ciently high, low-reliability ¯rms will ¯nd it unpro¯table to mimic
this strategy, and the equilibrium thus satis¯es the \Intuitive Criterion" of Cho and Kreps
(1987). Equilibrium e±ciency wages arise endogenously, in short, without a recourse to
limited liability arguments.22
Our primary point here concerns the use of incentives policies to do \double duty."
In the separating equilibrium, highly reliable ¯rms use wage policies to solve an agency
problem and to signal the ¯tness of the ¯rm. In order to pursue both objectives, these ¯rm
must compromise on their use of deferred compensation and this compromise necessarily
21In this model, young workers have concerns about the realization of high earnings at the ¯rm later in
their careers. Wages paid to young workers thus depend on the degree to which ¯rms that are judged to be
unstable.
22In the law ¯rm context, the term of art for paying very high wages to summer interns and associates is
\paying full freight." Law ¯rms that are able and willing to \pay full freight" signal that the value of their
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introduces distortion. Thus, in the separating equilibrium there is a surplus transfer to
workers employed by highly reliable ¯rms and employment in the reliable-¯rm sector is
ine±ciently low.
3.2. The Rat Race
Rat race models build on a simple observation: early in their careers many successful
professionals appear to be overworking. It is commonplace to ¯nd lawyers, consultants,
and assistant professors complaining that the hours they work are simply \too much" and
that they interfere with forming and raising a family. These strains are increased by the
dramatic in°ux of women into professional occupations because overwork is most intense
during prime years for family formation and childbearing. From the point of view of simple
models of labor markets, this sort of overwork is anomalous. Firms are in competition for
talent, and it would seem that the most successful competitors would be those who best
accommodate employee preferences about work conditions|including work hours. In his
famous paper on the \rat race," Akerlof (1976) o®ers a potential resolution to this anomaly
based on unobservable worker heterogeneity.
Akerlof's set-up focuses on a production line. At the end of the day, line workers are
jointly rewarded on the basis of total output. There are two types of workers|those inclined
to work hard and those inclined to work less hard. To employers these workers appear
identical, so they all earn the same wage. If both types of workers accept positions on the
production line, this is a great deal for low-e®ort workers (who would earn lower pay than
high-e®ort workers in a perfect-information world) but a bad deal for high-e®ort workers.
This is precisely the situation that might lead ¯rms to adopt rules that will provide high-
e®ort workers the opportunity to credibly signal that they are in fact high-e®ort workers.
Thus, Akerlof's proposed solution is that the ¯rm set the production line at a speed that
is uncomfortably fast for high-e®ort workers but more uncomfortable yet for low-e®ort
workers|so uncomfortable indeed that the low-e®ort workers will opt out of working for
the ¯rm. The rat race thereby serves the useful function of screening out the low-e®ort
workers.
In Akerlof's model, compensation policies are, quite clearly, doing \double duty." Com-
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level necessary to induce them to accept employment at the ¯rm, and (ii) to create incen-
tives that attract the \right kind" of worker to the ¯rm. The distortion here is that workers
are being asking to provide e®ort that exceeds the ¯rst-best level. In a marketplace with
many employers, the market can devolve into an equilibrium in which all ¯rms that hire
high-e®ort workers ask those workers to work at uncomfortable e®ort levels. This \adverse
selection" equilibrium occurs because any one ¯rm failing to adopt a rat race would be
swamped by low-e®ort workers. The equilibrium is ine±cient, in the sense that all ¯rms
would experience increased pro¯tability if they coordinated on a lower-e®ort work norm.23
Akerlof's demonstration of an overwork equilibrium was presented in a self-consciously
unrealistic example, but subsequent theoretical and empirical work suggests that it is an
important phenomenon in professional labor markets. For instance, in a paper with Renee
Landers (Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor, 1996), we embed Akerlof's idea into a simple
tournament-partnership model designed to shed light on work practices in large U.S. law
¯rms. In our two-period model, young lawyers accept salaried positions as \associates" for
one period, and if deemed suitable are promoted to be \partners" (equity shareholders) in
the subsequent period. Partners share equally in ¯rm surplus. This equal sharing rule gives
incumbent partners powerful incentives to promote only highly motivated lawyers into the
partnership.
We assume that there are two types of lawyers who are equally productive but have
di®ering preferences over the hours they prefer to work: these are \short-hour" and \long-
hour" workers. Now in our setting, ¯rms have the incentive to attract workers who will be
inclined to work long hours. The reason is that when workers become partners|at which
point they share ¯rm surplus|the long-hours individuals will engage in less free riding.
As in Akerlof's model, an adverse selection equilibrium emerges. In our case, associates'
willingness to put in extended hours over many years serves as a credible signal that they
are long-hour individuals.
23Intuitively, the over-work equilibrium might persist even when there is a small number of low-e®ort
workers. No one ¯rm can deviate from the equilibrium without su®ering harm from adverse selection. But
if all ¯rms backed away from overwork requirements, any one ¯rm would get stuck with only a negligible
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Empirical evidence for the relevance of the over-work equilibrium comes from an empirical
examination of work hours and work preferences in associates at two large East Coast law
¯rms. In a survey conducted in these ¯rms, we ¯nd that most associates express a prefer-
ence for working shorter hours (with a correspondingly lower salary) but, importantly, their
willingness to work shorter hours hinges on the work-hour norms adopted by other asso-
ciates. In addition, we ¯nd that in making promotion decisions, partners use an associate's
willingness to work long hours as an indicator of the motivation associates have to excel.
These ¯ndings would not be expected in a conventional labor market, but are precisely what
one would expect if work hours are being used as a signal of one's otherwise-unobservable
type.
In our paper (Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor, 1996) we abstract from \career concerns"
outside one's own ¯rm, but it is clear that overwork early in one's career might be valuable
not only as a signal within a ¯rm but as a means of career advancement elsewhere. Com-
pletion of six years as an associate at a law ¯rm known for abusing associates with grueling
hours can be a valuable means of demonstrating an important but hard-to-observe trait to
other employers in the marketplace.
The key idea that current on-the-job behaviors can a®ect one's future career, through
their impact on reputation, is studied in insightful papers by HolmstrÄ om (1999) and Gibbons
and Waldman (1999). Gicheva (2009) shows how long work hours early in one's career can
a®ect an individual's value in the market later in the career. Gicheva shows, further,
that her model helps explain wage growth in a sample of workers who took the Graduate
Management Admissions Test (GMAT). Speci¯cally, she shows that among workers who
worked above-norm hours when they were young (48 or more hours per week), subsequent
wage growth was positively correlated with early career hours worked. The same was not
true for those workers who worked fewer than 48 hours; for those workers wage growth was
uncorrelated with hours worked.
Signalling can be particularly dysfunctional in situations in which workers can devote
e®ort to more than one task|an issue we take up next|because it can distort e®ort allo-
cation. An example is given in the work of Acemoglu, Kremer, and Mian (2008). In their
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teachers|misguided because some e®ort is devoted to improving the signal (student perfor-
mance on a pro¯ciency test), without actually improving students' true human capital. An
important conclusion in that paper is that the problem of excessive signalling can funda-
mentally shape the desirability of using markets versus the government for the provision of
some services. Speci¯cally, in a competitive market, there will be socially costly distortions
as the result of excessive signalling. An advantage of having teachers employed in the public
sector is that the government might be able to commit to policies that eliminate excessive
signalling.
3.3. Multi-Tasking
Perhaps the most obvious case of dual-purpose incentives occurs when a principal seeks to
regulate an agent's behaviors along more than one dimension. We have already encountered
examples along these lines in our discussions above. For instance, in our examination
of CEO compensation, we noted problems that arise when a compensation board seeks
to create incentives for a CEO to exert e®ort toward increasing shareholder value and
limiting wasteful expenditure in the executive suite. Our discussion of tournament incentives
suggests a second obvious example: What happens in a tournament when each worker
must be motivated to provide e®ort along his own assigned task and be motivated also to
be cooperative with other workers?24 A third example is Acemoglu, Kremer, and Mian's
work, mentioned in the previous paragraph, in which teachers allocate e®ort that improves
student human capital and e®ort that merely improves a student's test score (\teaching to
the test").
HolmstrÄ om and Milgrom (1991) establish a number of insightful and surprising results
in precisely such contexts. The central point of their paper is both simple and profound:
when an agent performs multiple tasks, incentives must perform the double duty of inducing
appropriately high levels of e®ort generally and inducing a desirable allocation of an agent's
attention across the various tasks inherent in the job.
We can get a feel for their analysis by making a simple extension to our baseline principal
agent model. Let us suppose now that the agent can allocate e®ort along two dimensions,
e1 ¸ 0 and e2 ¸ 0. We suppose also that the agent's utility is now w + d(e1 + e2); and,
24A number of papers have taken up this issue, including Lazear (1989).EXTRINSIC REWARDS AND INTRINSIC MOTIVES 31
following HolmstrÄ om and Milgrom, we make two key assumption about the function that
gives money metric disutility of e®ort, d( ) : (i) it is convex and (ii) it achieves a maximum
at a positive level of e®ort. This last assumption means that in the absence of direct
incentives the worker will be happiest when putting forth some e®ort. The principal's
objective continues to be the maximization of value added by the worker, now given by
g(e1;e2) ¡ w:
A principal who has reasonably accurate measures of e1 and e2, say x1 and x2; will be
able to construct an incentive scheme in which bonuses reward each dimension of e®ort
appropriately. Matters are more interesting when the principal has good information along
one dimension of e®ort but not the other. To take an extreme example, suppose the ¯rm
has a subjective measure x1, but no measure at all of x2. The ¯rms best strategy then will
depend crucially on the nature of the production function, g(e1;e2). To see how this works,
we set d(e1 +e2) to be ¡1
2(e1 +e2 ¡eB)2; with eB > 0 representing the agent's \bliss" level
of e®ort, and work out the optimal incentives for two di®erent production functions: ¯rst, a
case in which the two types of e®ort are perfect substitutes, g(e1;e2) = a1e1 +a2e2; second,
a case in which they are complements, g(e1;e2) = e1e2:
The solution to the ¯rst case is easy to characterize. If the ¯rm places any incentive
whatsoever on the ¯rst type of e®ort (i.e., a bonus based on x1), the worker's best response
will be ^ e2 = 0; and with this in mind the ¯rm can follow the steps outlined for our baseline
one-dimensional principal agent model. It is easy to con¯rm that the result will be to elicit
e®ort e¤
1 = a1 + eB: Intuitively, the ¯rm will prefer this strategy if the value of the ¯rst
type of e®ort is high relative to the second type of e®ort, which is certainly true if a1 ¸ a2.
On the other hand, if a2 is su±ciently large, the principal might decide to use no explicit
incentive and instead ask (nicely!) that the worker direct all his e®ort along the second
dimension. Given a binding participation constraint, w ¡ 1
2(e1 + e2 ¡ eB)2 = v; it is easily
shown that value added by the worker is






1 ¡ v when incentives are placed on e1;and
a2eB ¡ v when agent e®ort is directed to e2:32 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
As anticipated, if a1 is su±ciently high relative to a2; the ¯rm will simply place incentives
on the observable portion of performance. This is e±cient when a1 ¸ a2; and is second-best
optimal even when a1 is moderately lower than a2. However, when a1 is su±ciently low
relative to a2, the ¯rm will instead try a \cooperative" strategy. No incentives are used;
the worker is simply asked to direct all e®ort to the second dimension.
The solution to the second case, in which the two types of e®ort are complements, is also
intuitive. When g(e1;e2) = e1e2; the ¯rm clearly must avoid a best response of ^ e2 = 0; and
so will never use an explicit incentive along the ¯rst e®ort dimension. In this case the ¯rm
instead directs the worker e®ort to be e1 = e2 = eB
2 and hopes that the worker complies.
Simple as this analysis is, several interesting points emerge:
First, we see that there will be cases in which an employer will choose not to place an
incentive on an easily-observed dimension of performance, even when that e®ort is valuable
to the ¯rm. This happens when there is a similarly-valuable second dimension of e®ort
that is su±ciently di±cult to observe and incentivize. Such an outcome is particularly
likely when multiple tasks are complementary. In such cases the ¯rm is best o® using very
low-powered incentives, i.e., simply paying a base wage.
Second, as shown by our second example, the principal's optimal incentive plan can result
in a second-best outcome that is far from e±cient. For instance, when g(e1;e2) = e1e2;
it is easily con¯rmed that the e±cient level of output is e2
B.25 The ¯rm's low-powered
incentive scheme results, instead, in output 1
4e2
B. If possible the ¯rm would very much
like to ¯nd a way to make this worker a residual claimant, and indeed would be willing to
su®er substantial cost along some other dimension to make this happen. In short, a strong
motive exists here to outsource the task at to an independent contractor if this can be made
workable.26
25Maximize e1e2 ¡ w subject to w ¡
1
2(e1 + e2 ¡ eB)
2 ¸ v:
26From a legal perspective, employees are distinguished from independent contractors by the extent of
control and supervision the principal exerts over the actions of the agent. A large literature focuses on the
forces that drive ¯rm boundaries, focusing on such issues as the direction of employee activities (e.g., Coase,
1937, and Simon, 1951), and ¯rm ownership of assets (e.g., Williamson, 1985, and Grossman and Hart,
1986). The relationship between these issues, and the agency problem|particularly in the multi-tasking
setting|is developed clearly in HolmstrÄ om and Milgrom (1994).
Many papers examine the relationship between ¯rm boundaries and employment relationships in speci¯c
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Third, when a ¯rm cannot use independent contracting, or for some compelling reason
chooses not to, a central goal of the ¯rm often entails structuring activities to improve
management's ability to closely monitor and supervise key contributions by employees. Put
another way, the issue of multi-tasking can matter a great deal for the organization of ¯rm
production.
Finally, and most important for our purposes, the multi-tasking approach developed by
HolmstrÄ om and Milgrom, and illustrated with the simple example above, clearly opens the
door for \behavioral factors" to play a central role. For example, in our model, the \bliss"
level of e®ort (eB) is taken to be an exogenous constant. This unfortunate abstraction
overlooks the many sociological and psychological factors that determine how intrinsically
motivated individuals contribute to the success of their ¯rm. These are the sorts of consid-
eration that lead one into the territory of behavioral economics.
4. Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Motivation
In this section of the paper, we expand the psychological and sociological foundations of
agency models. Our focus will be on behaviors that seem to us especially relevant to the
understanding of agency|\social" or \other regarding" preferences.
Social preferences arise because people are naturally inclined to compare their own pay-
o®s, sacri¯ces and behaviors to others, and often care about the impact of their actions
on others. Economists have long understood that these \other regarding" preferences are
important.27 Recent progress in the behavioral economics literature has greatly deepened
this understanding through the development of new theoretical models and novel empiri-
cal investigations using both experimental and observational data. As we discuss below,
social preferences matter for agency problems because they o®er an explanation for the
norms and reference points that agents use to assess their pay, work e®ort and happiness.28
organizations, and the research one of us conducted on worker contracts in the petrochemical industry
(Rebitzer, 1995).
27For example, several decades back Gary Becker initiated important strands of inquiry in economics by
positing preferences that incorporate such factors as \altruism" (Becker, 1981) or \distaste" for interaction
with people of a di®erent race (Becker, 1957).
28Assessments based on reference points play an important role in behavioral economics generally, in-
cluded features germane to labor economics. Kahneman and Tversky's \prospect theory" of decision making
under uncertainty argues that individuals are loss averse and that they calculate gains and losses relative
to (potentially manipulable) reference points (Rabin and Thaler, 2001). Sometimes reference points are34 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
An important insight from the behavioral approach is that the role played by these norms
and reference points varies depending on whether one is considering the agency problem in
isolation or in a competitive setting.
Our discussion of social preferences in agency considers four distinct but related mani-
festations of other regarding preferences: pay status, e®ort norms, professional norms and
identity. In each of these sections we begin by sketching a model that makes modest mod-
i¯cations to the standard agency models discussed above. We then consider how well the
central predictions of the enhanced model are supported by available empirical analysis.29
4.1. Pay Status: Financial Incentives and Inequality Aversion Within Firms
People dislike inequality|especially when they have drawn the short straw. Indeed,
there is substantial indirect evidence that wellbeing is shaped in large measure by compar-
isons with others.
30 This idea can matter within organizations because people are likely
to compare themselves with others around them in the workplace. In turn this can be an
important determinant in shaping ¯rm compensation policies.
The idea that interpersonal comparisons matter to agents can easily be captured by
including \asymmetric inequality aversion" into utility functions. Utility is increasing in
determined by the status quo or by inertia (e.g., Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, and Genesove and Mayer,
2001).
We do not discuss labor supply here, but note that reference points can be important in those models
as well. Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997), for instance, argue that the labor supply of
taxi drivers seems to entail drivers evaluating their daily income relative to a daily target. (See also Farber,
2005 and 2008, for additional evidence, some of it to the contrary, and DellaVigna, 2009, for a clarifying
discussion.) Fehr and Goette (2007) provide evidence for a ¯eld experiment suggesting that loss aversion
and reference points may be important in determining work intensity.
29Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) provide a nice justi¯cation for this approach: \Theories in behavioral
economics ::: strive for generality|e.g., by adding only one or two parameters to standard models. Particular
parameter values then often reduce the behavioral model to the standard one, and the behavioral model can
be pitted against the standard model by estimating parameter values. Once parameter values are pinned
down, the behavioral model can be applied just as widely as the standard one."
More generally, Camerer and Lowenstein's paper provides an insightful introduction to a broad and
rich set of ideas in behavioral economics, including observations about the origins of modern behavioral
economics, and suggestions about future directions for the ¯eld. DellaVigna (2009) gives a good recent
review of behavioral economics, focusing on evidence drawn from the ¯eld.
30This is the basis, for example, of the well-known \Easterlin paradox"|the paradoxical results that
(i) individuals who are low in a nation's income distribution report themselves to be unhappy, (ii) the
average level of unhappiness does not much vary across nations with di®erent levels of aggregate income,
and (iii) countries do not get much happier as they get richer. While there is evidence to suggest that
absolute income matters for happiness (e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008), it seems clear that one's standing
on the economic totem pole matters as well. Frank's (1985) well known book provides an interesting and
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one's own income, of course, but decreasing in the income of other relatively-wealthier
comparison individuals. The \asymmetry" refers to a presumption that agents su®er more
from inequality that is to their material disadvantage than they gain from inequality that
is to their material advantage (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
31
As an example of how asymmetric inequality aversion can a®ect our agency models, recall
the tournament model, as set out in Section 2.2.2. In that model, workers had utility given
by w¡e; and made a net contribution of g(e)¡w: The ¯rm conditioned pay on an imperfect
measure of e: it paid a base wage w0 to all workers, and in addition gave a bonus b to the
fraction (1¡P) of workers who had the highest observed performance. (The \bonus" in this
case would typically be a promotion to a higher-paying job.) Given workers' best-response
e®ort choices, we saw that this simple tournament resulting in all workers supplying the
e±cient e®ort level, i.e., they choose e¤ = ^ e(b¤) that solves g0(e¤) = 1:






w0 + b ¡ ±Wb ¡ e for \winners," and
w0 ¡ ±Lb ¡ e for \losers."
Here, ±W ¸ 0 re°ects the possibility that winners feel empathy for losers, proportional
to the inequality generated (but of course people do like to win, so ±W < 1). ±L > ±W
re°ects the fact that workers who do not win the bonus su®er an even large utility loss
due to inequality aversion. Repeating steps outlined in Section 2.2.2, we can show that the
principal's solution now has a ¯rst-order condition
(27) [g0(^ e(b¤¤)) ¡ 1]^ e0(b¤¤) = (±L ¡ ±W)P > 0;
and, since e0(b) > 0; we have g0(e¤¤) > 1; which in turn means that the ¯rm here settles for
a second-best e®ort level, e¤¤ < e¤:
Inequality aversion causes the incentive pay parameter to do the \double duty" of eliciting
work e®ort and determining the extent of expected pay inequality in the ¯rm. As a result,
31The assertion that utility ins in°uenced by inequality aversion represents a \stripped down" way of char-
acterizing the behavioral phenomena under study. Our initial treatment makes no distinction about agent
attributions concerning the nature of inequality (e.g., what the inequality might say about the principal's
intentions or other agents' intentions). We consider more sophisticated approaches below.36 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
the ¯rm must compromise along an important dimension by lowering incentive pay, b, and
reducing the e®ort level elicited from workers. Equation (27) also shows that in this setting
the ¯rm will want to be careful how it sets its promotion rate. Here the ¯rm would like (all
else equal) to set P near 0, which would allow e®ort to approach ¯rst-best. Intuitively, the
cost to the ¯rm of inequality is lowest when there are relatively few people who are a®ected
by the inequality, i.e., when the promotion rate, 1 ¡ P; is close to 1.
The logic of this model of income comparisons underlies Frank's (1984) seminal article
on inequality aversion in labor markets. In his treatment, an employee gains in utility
from being high in the ¯rm's pay hierarchy and loses utility from having a low position.
Just as in our model, these concerns cause ¯rms to operate with lower-powered incentives.
Frank presents evidence drawn from many di®erent types of organizations; he sees, for
example, a dampening e®ect in commissions paid to car salesman and realtors as well as
pay compression among college professors.
Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer (2007) present a similar analysis of these issues in the
context of incentive pay within medical partnerships. In these professional organizations,
physicians determine incentive intensity by choosing how broadly they wish to share the
income they generate with others in the practice. For example, groups often choose to
share income equally across physicians|in a practice with n physicians, each physician
keeps 1=n of pro¯ts|which minimizes inequality. The practice of equal sharing rules has
the potential disadvantage, though, of o®ering the lowest possible level of incentive intensity
to partners. The model of inequality aversion set out by Encinosa, et al. shows that the
tension between these forces makes sharing rules less attractive in large partnerships than
in smaller partnerships|a result supported by the available data. The authors also present
evidence consistent the notion that physicians compare e®ort as well as income. We take
up e®ort comparisons in the next section.
As a second example of the potential impact of inequality aversion in a principal agent
setting, consider the multi-tasking model we examined in Section 3.3. Recall that in that
model, we assumed an agent's utility is represented by w ¡ 1
2(e1 + e2 ¡ eB)2; where eB is a
positive constant, and we assumed further that the principal had a good signal for e1 but
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a ¯xed wage w that meets the participation constraint (i.e., so that w = v) and then direct
the agent to allocate e®ort so that e1 = e2 = eB
2 : Now suppose that the agent is inequality
averse, just as in (26), but that in this case her comparison is the principal's income, ¼. So




(e1 + e2 ¡ eB)2 ¡ ±(¼ ¡ w); if w < ¼;
where ± > 0 re°ects the extent to which the agent is inequality averse. The important point
here is that the agent can always costlessly enforce perfect equality by simply adjusting
e®ort allocation (keeping total e®ort at eB); she can reduce the principal's pro¯ts, while
causing no harm to herself. If the principal sets the wage to v, the agent will adjust e®ort
so that ¼ also equals v. So the principal typically ¯nds it pro¯table to increase w above the
participation constraint, i.e., the principal uses \rent sharing." Reducing wages to the level
of the employee's outside option would be self-defeating in this context because it risks that
the agent will become disgruntled and take steps to \even the score."
The idea that inequity aversion supports rent sharing has been extensively explored in
laboratory and ¯eld experiments involving variations on the Ultimatum Game. In this
bargaining game a proposer o®ers to divide a ¯xed amount of money between himself and a
responder. The responder can accept or reject this o®er. If the o®er is accepted, the money
is divided according to the o®er. If the o®er is rejected by the responder, however, neither
the responder nor the proposer gets any money. The conventional game theoretic solution
to this bargaining problem for sel¯sh players is for the proposer to make an o®er in which
he keeps all (or nearly all) of the money while the responder accepts any o®er.
It turns out, however, that the participants in these games don't behave as entirely sel¯sh
players. Proposers routinely make o®ers close to an equal division of the pie and responders
routinely reject low o®ers. These anomalies can be resolved, of course, by introducing equity
concerns into players' utility functions. Inequality averse proposers get less utility than
entirely sel¯sh players do by proposing a division of the pie that greatly favors themselves.
Conversely, inequality averse responders can credibly threaten to destroy the surplus if
highly unequal divisions are proposed. In practice, reasonably egalitarian o®ers are made
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Most employment relationships exist in the context of labor markets. Thus it is not
su±cient to demonstrate that individuals prefer more equitable pay practices. Economists
must also establish that these preferences matter for the equilibria that emerge in markets.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) examine this central issue by considering whether the egalitarian
rent sharing observed in the Ultimatum Game survives in an environment in which there
are many proposers and a single responder who must accept or reject the best o®er received.
They ¯nd that competition between proposers leads to lower levels of egalitarianism. To see
the logic, consider a situation in which n proposers each o®ered 50 percent to the responder,
leaving each proposer with a 1=n chance of having his o®er accepted. An individual proposer
could clearly do better by simply o®ering a 51 percent share to the responder, thereby
insuring that his o®er was selected (the probability increases from 1=n to 1). But all
proposers are driven by this same logic, and in the end the responder gets all the surplus.
This, of course, is the outcome we would observe if proposers had no inequality aversion.
The irrelevance of inequality aversion stems from the fact that with many competitors,
no single player can prevent an inequitable outcome. If no individual action can reduce
the inequality of the equilibrium outcome, then inequality aversion cannot be an important
determinant of behavior. Fehr and Schmidt conclude that matters are di®erent when indi-
vidual players have a way to impose a cost on the counterparty to a highly unequal o®er
(as does the agent in the example we consider with equation (28)). Speci¯cally,
::: competition renders fairness considerations irrelevant if and only if none
of the competing players can punish the monopolist by destroying some
of the surplus and enforcing a more equitable outcome. This suggests that
fairness plays a smaller role in most markets for goods than in labor markets.
This follows from the fact that, in addition to the rejection of low wage o®ers,
workers have some discretion over their work e®ort. By varying their e®ort,
they can exert a direct impact on the relative material payo® of the employer
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
In short, agency problems of the sort depicted in our model above (that allows retaliation
motivated by equity concerns), can survive market competition.
The Fehr-Schmidt conjecture has been examined experimentally by Fischbacher, Fong
and Fehr (2009).32 They ¯nd that increasing proposer competition in the Ultimatum Game,
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by adding extra proposers, causes a large increase in mean accepted o®ers. Similarly,
increasing responder competition causes a reduction in mean accepted o®ers. Both of these
results suggest that competition undercuts the in°uence of equity norms on bargaining
outcomes, although in each case the increase in inequality of outcomes is less than one
would predict on the basis of competition alone.
The idea that workers exact retribution upon employers when treated unfairly is sup-
ported by Bewley's (1999) extensive qualitative interviews. He found that managers and
other labor market participants believe that there is a connection between employee morale
and performance. Bewley focuses on the morale e®ects of cutting wages in recessions:
Employers are averse to cutting wages because of the fear of a backlash from employees.
Evidence that the fear of backlash is reasonable emerges from a number of recent studies
by Mas and co-authors. In a remarkable study, Mas (2006) ¯nds that when New Jersey
police o±cers loose in ¯nal o®er arbitration, so that the wage they receive is lower than
the requested wage, arrest rates and average sentence lengths decline, while crime reports
rise. This evidence is consistent with the idea that workers are less inclined to provide
e®ort when the wage falls below a salient reference wage. Krueger and Mas (2004) report
evidence that a long and contentious strike and the hiring of replacement workers in a
Bridgestone/Firestone plant contributed to the production of defective tires. Mas (2008)
¯nds Caterpillar plants that underwent contract disputes experienced reduced workmanship
and reduced product quality. In this latter study he estimates that the contract dispute
was associated with at least $400 million in lost service °ows due to inferior quality.
The papers cited in the previous paragraph study workers in unionized environments.
The presence of a union likely facilitates the sort of collective retaliation that punishes
employers who take morale lowering actions. The central idea, that perceptions of unfairness
can damage e®ort, is likely to be important outside the union sector. Evidence along these
lines appears, for example, in our ¯eld experiment with Nagin and Sanders (Nagin, et
al., 2002), which manipulated monitoring levels at call centers collecting donations for
charitable causes. In that study, conducted in a non-union environment, we had access
to a direct measure of malfeasance on the part of individual employees as well as direct
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malfeasance is the rate at which employees arti¯cially in°ated their level of sales in order
to earn extra commissions at the expense of the ¯rm. The employer could catch some,
but not all, of this activity through costly monitoring of a random sample of calls. When
employees worked in centers with very low apparent rates of monitoring, opportunistic
behavior increased. However, this increase was observed only for a subset of employees,
and, importantly, increased opportunism was most prevalent among among workers who
had expressed feelings that the employer treated them unfairly, did not care about them,
and provided a bad place to work.33 Employees who perceived themselves to be unfairly
treated struck back at the employer (and added to their own income) when the opportunity
to do so arose.
Inequality aversion on the part of employees has a number of interesting ancillary predic-
tions about the way employment relationships are organized. Firms that employ people in
both low-wage and high-wage occupations must go to some length to be sure that employ-
ees in the low-wage occupation do not include the high-wage occupation in their reference
group. Failure to make this separation can lead to pressures to either pay employees in the
low-wage occupation too much or employees in the high-wage occupation too little. Indeed,
it would not be at all surprising to see ¯rms choosing outsourcing to other ¯rms to avoid
just these sorts of invidious comparisons.
Similarly, if employees respond to perceived inequities by retaliating along important,
but hard-to-monitor dimensions of work e®ort and quality, ¯rms that engage in highly
unequal pay practices ought to seek out ways to reduce the perceived level of inequality.
Secrecy regarding pay is a common human resource practice and it obviously makes invidious
pay comparisons more di±cult. Some companies, such as Walmart and Lincoln Electric,
famously go to great lengths to discourage ostentatious executive perks and the depressing
e®ects on morale they might engender.
For publicly traded corporations the compensation of top executives is a matter of public
record. In practice, however, these companies adopt complex and opaque compensation
practices that make it di±cult to understand exactly how much and in what ways top
33These attitude questions were collected in an anonymous survey of employees conducted before the
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executives are paid. Bebchuck and Fried (2003) argue that anomalous features of executive
compensation|such as the reliance on \at the money" stock options rather than stock
grants|are best understood as e®orts to camou°age pay and so avoid \outrage" from
shareholders, employees, regulators and other interested parties.
Levy and Temin (2007) examine these outrage costs from an institutional and historical
perspective. They argue that the Federal government enforced a set of informal yet egal-
itarian social norms on executive pay from the post World War II era through the early
1970's. These norms were part of a larger set of institutional arrangements that included
powerful unions, high minimum wages, and high marginal tax rates for high earners. The
actions taken by Reagan administration in the 1980s (notably the ¯ring of the air-tra±c
controllers) signaled that the Federal government was leaving such decisions as CEO pay
strictly to market forces. The degree to which income norms can be shaped by national in-
stitutions and economic policy is an important question that would bene¯t from additional
empirical and historical research.
4.2. E®ort Norms
Fehr and Schmidt's key idea is that equity concerns constrain ¯rm behavior even in
competitive labor markets, because of behavioral features in agency problems inherent in
employment relationships. If, as appears to be the case, employees respond to unequal or
unfair treatment by taking actions that punish the employer, it is a short further step to
presume that morale enhancing activities ought to motivate employees to take actions in
the interest of their employer. This is the premise of Akerlof's (1982) gift exchange model
of e±ciency wages.
Akerlof's model plays a central role in behavioral labor economics because it relies on
very di®erent sociological and psychological mechanisms than the standard agency approach
presented in Section 2 above. Instead of engaging in calculations about the costs and bene¯ts
of working harder, employees in Akerlof's model are motivated by norms governing behavior
in the exchange of gifts. If the employer pays employees a wage higher than some reference
wage, the employee perceives himself to have received a gift from the employer. This gift
creates an obligation to give something valuable in return. In the employment context, the42 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
obvious way to reciprocate is to provide the ¯rm with more than the minimally acceptable
level of work e®ort and attention.
Akerlof's approach to the problem of agency rests critically on the concept of e®ort norms,
i.e., on the idea that individuals are motivated to provide e®ort in ways that enable them
to conform to their self image or social identity. Decent people, so the reasoning might go,
return kindness with kindness and so, wishing to preserve the self image of decency, the
employee responds to a high wage by returning the favor in the form of high e®ort to the
employer.34
Experimental investigations suggest that reciprocity of the sort identi¯ed in Akerlof can
survive in competitive environments. For example, Fehr, et al. (1998) report results from a
laboratory experiment in which sellers have the opportunity to select quality levels above the
minimum level enforceable by buyers. In treatments where sellers have the opportunity to do
so, they reciprocate high prices with high quality levels. Anticipating this behavior, buyers
pro¯t by o®ering high prices far in excess of the seller's reservation prices. In treatments
where sellers do not have the opportunity to reciprocate, buyers o®er lower prices.
If employee e®ort responds to the perceived \fairness" of wage o®ers, then policy makers
must pay special attention to policies that might shift perceptions of the \fairness" of a wage
o®er. Policy may be especially likely to a®ect fairness if individuals care about employer
intentions as well as outcomes. A wage of X in the absence of a minimum wage might be
perceived to be quite fair because employers could have o®ered a good deal less but choose
not to. If, on the other hand, the minimum wage was set to be X; then the employer might
have to o®er a wage above X to demonstrate good intentions.
In an important paper, Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2006) investigate whether minimum
wage laws in°uence the perceived fairness of wage o®ers. They set up an experimental labor
market in which individual employees (students paid to participate in the experiment) have
to decide whether or not to accept a job o®ered by a ¯rm. Contrary to the conventional self-
interest model, but consistent with a fairness-concerns model, individuals had reservation
34This idea is modeled in an insightful way in an important paper by Rabin (1993). Charness and
Rabin (2002) provide a clear statement of the ideas, and give reference to further literature. They also give
compelling evidence from laboratory experiments on reciprocity. For a discussion of additional experimental
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wages signi¯cantly above zero. There was also considerable heterogeneity in reservation
wages, giving individual ¯rms an upwardly sloping supply curve for labor. Introducing
a minimum wage in this labor market had the e®ect of increasing individual reservation
wages considerably|a result consistent with the hypothesis that the perceived intentions
of the ¯rm matter in determining fairness. Surprisingly, there appeared to be hysteresis
in the e®ect of minimum wage laws on reservation wages: subjects exposed to the laws
after participating in labor markets with no minimum wage laws increased their reservation
wages, but subjects who ¯rst participated in labor markets with minimum wages did not
revise reservation wages downwards when the laws were removed. These results, if they
hold outside the laboratory, have implications that extend far beyond the issue of minimum
wage laws. Labor market regulations that in°uence employer scope of action must take
into account how these regulations are likely to a®ect employee perceptions of employer
intentions. More provocatively, the hysteresis result also raises the possibility that regulators
might not be able to \undo" the e®ects of policy simply by reversing previous decisions.
In strong form, well-functioning norms can have considerable social value. They can
serve to reduce the problems created by agency in many contexts, including employment
relationships within ¯rms.
Given their considerable economic value, it is important to understand the social pro-
cesses that generate and sustain socially valuable e®ort norms. In a path-breaking economic
analysis, Frank (1988) emphasizes the role of emotions in resolving the \commitment prob-
lem," i.e., the problem of eliciting a commitment to constructive cooperation. He argues
that rational calculation is often not su±cient to sustain cooperation because by the time
the misbehavior occurs, the bene¯t of punishing the bad actor has often already passed.
Emotions, in contrast, can be the foundation of much more powerful sanctions because the
commitment to follow through on the action is rooted in the primitive reward structure of
the brain. Thus, \cross me and you'll never work in this town again" is a weak deterrent
when uttered by a rational calculator who may decide after the fact that it is not worth
the e®ort to punish the double-crosser. It is a strong deterrent, however, when uttered by
someone who gets visceral satisfaction in carrying out his threat regardless of the cost to
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From a psychological perspective, emotions emerge from a genetically determined neu-
rological reward system. The triggers of this reward system, however, are shaped by an
intense and costly socialization process that trains individuals to have a \conscience," i.e.,
to feel strong emotions when they lie, cheat or otherwise disappoint others' expectations.
Evolutionary considerations led Frank to expect that these e®orts at socialization will not
be entirely successful. Society will be composed of a mixture of types: opportunists who
take advantage of chances to free ride and reciprocators who will devote resources to mon-
itoring the behavior of their counterparties and cooperate so long as they perceive others
doing the same.35
The idea that populations contain a mixture of opportunists and reciprocators is sup-
ported by experiments involving public good contribution games. Fehr and Gaetcher (2000)
study such games and contrast two treatments. In the \no punishment" treatment, anony-
mous individuals are randomly allocated to groups of four and are given the opportunity to
make contributions towards a public good. Payo®s are such that the dominant strategy is
to make no contributions towards the public good. In the \punishment" treatment a second
stage is added which gives each individual the opportunity to punish others by subtracting
from their payout. Punishing poor contributors is costly, however, and no one interested
in maximizing their monetary payo® will choose to punish after the damage is done.36 For
this reason one would expect the dominant strategy to be one of \no contribution" in both
punishment and no-punishment treatments. This prediction is con¯rmed in the \no pun-
ishment" game: average contributions converge to almost complete free-riding. In contrast,
in games with the option to punish in the second stage, individuals do make substantial
35In a population entirely composed of cooperators there will be little reason to devote resources to
monitoring the actions of others. This is an environment in which opportunists will thrive. Conversely,
in an environment with many opportunists, cooperators will enjoy an advantage so long as they devote
resources to monitoring their counterparts. Evolutionarily stable equilibria will therefore involve a mix of
opportunists and cooperators with the latter spending resources seeking to weed out or punish the former.
See, e.g., Gintis, et al. (2003).
36The fact that some individuals will punish opportunists even when it is not in their direct material
interest suggests that punishment is supported by psychological reward mechanisms rather than rational
calculation. Consistent with this view, recent brain imaging studies taken during an economic experiment
involving trust and retaliation suggest that punishment of individuals who violate trust activates a brain
region, the Caudate, that is involved in actions motivated by anticipated rewards (de Quervain, et al., 2004).
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contributions to the public good and these contributions do not fall over time. Consistent
with our e®ort norms model, subjects are more heavily punished the more his or her con-
tribution falls below the average contribution of other group members. Individuals also
exhibit heterogeneous tendencies to free-ride and punish. Depending on the de¯nition, the
authors estimate that between 20 and 53 percent of subjects in their study were free riders.
Heterogeneity in the tendency to behave opportunistically has important implications for
labor markets and personnel practices that we explore further in Section 5.
Emotions can support pro-social behavior in ways other than sustaining irrationally high
levels of retaliation against defectors. Ekman (2001), for example, argues that emotional
states can be read from the facial expressions of individuals. It follows from this that lying
and other opportunistic activities that can elicit strong emotions are harder to sustain during
face to face interactions. Valley, et al. (1998) investigate this hypothesis in a bargaining
experiment which requires negotiators to elicit private information about the true value of
an underlying asset when the incentives in the experiment do not support revealing this
information truthfully. The study ¯nds that face to face negotiations are more likely to reach
mutually bene¯cial solutions than negotiations conducted over the phone or in writing.
The feelings of guilt and shame that support truth telling and honesty are similar to
the emotions that support e®ort norms, and these emotions are generally thought to be
strengthened by physical proximity and face to face interactions (Sally, 2002). A nice
laboratory experiment by Falk and Ichino (2006) provides evidence along these lines. In
particular, in that study the authors observed \peer e®ects" in which subjects who would
otherwise have provided low e®ort were motivated to increase e®ort when physically paired
with high-productivity workers.37
In a remarkable study of cashiers at a national supermarket chain, Mas and Moretti (2008)
¯nd that substituting a worker with below average productivity for a worker with above
average productivity is associated with a 1 percent increase in the e®ort of other workers
on the same shift. Low productivity workers are especially responsive to the composition
of their co-workers and this peer e®ect occurs only for low productivity workers who are
37On net, Falk and Ichino estimate a positive impact on output due to these peer e®ects similar to
estimate of peer e®ects on absenteeism behavior found in Ichino and Maggi's (2000) study of workers in
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in the line of vision of the high productivity workers. The e®ect of high output peers on
the productivity of others declines with distance and with the frequency of interaction as
measured by the degree to which shifts overlap.
If e®ort norms indeed require close proximity and frequent interactions within a work
group, it is natural to ask whether these motives can operate in large organizations. Very
little empirical work has focused on this important issue.38
E®ort norms clearly matter within organizations and work groups, and may have impor-
tant implications for broader labor markets as well. In the gift exchange model, as ¯rst
set out by Akerlof (1982), the \gift" that results in the optimal reciprocal responses from
agents is a wage that exceeds the market-clearing wage. The consequence is equilibrium
unemployment (see also Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). If some ¯rms and industries ¯nd it im-
portant to use gift exchange as a motivating tool, and others do not, then the gift exchange
model can be used to explain \dual labor markets," i.e., to help understand cross-¯rm and
cross-industry wage variation.
As Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) argue, the gift
exchange logic|that worker performance depends on a ¯rm's current wage relative to a
reference wage and to the unemployment rate|can be a building block for macroeconomic
models. In Akerlof, et al. (2000), for instance, a reference wage model is combined with
an assumption that some principals adopt \near rational" wage setting rules whereby they
ignore the e®ect of in°ation on reference wages when in°ation rates are su±ciently low. The
consequence is a long-run Phillips curve with the property that a modest rate of in°ation
38A nice exception is Knez and Simester (2001). This case study of Continental Airlines ¯nds evidence
of the apparent success a ¯rm-wide incentive scheme that paid out a modest sum of money to almost all
employees if the airline's aggregate on-time departure statistics cleared a certain threshold. The authors
argue that e®ort norms, enforced by the relatively small and homogeneous ramp and ground crews at each
airport, could and did augment the low-powered ¯nancial incentives inherent in the bonus plan.
An important question concerns the extent to which norms can persist in cross-functional work groups
where the social distance between members of the group might be high. Such work groups|composed of
employees with widely di®erent levels of income, status and education|play an important role in the health
care system (e.g., in teams that include surgeons and high school educated technicians working together
to improve processes). The failure of e®ort norms and peer pressure to operate in these settings likely
contributes to ine±ciencies in our health care system (as described, e.g., in Cebul, et al., 2008, and other
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(approximately 3% in their calibration) is associated with a lower unemployment rate than
is either 0 in°ation or high in°ation.39
4.3. Professional Norms
In professions such as law and medicine, the principal agent problem takes on a special
importance. Professionals are in theory the agents of their clients, but professionals en-
joy advantages of education, credentials, status and specialized knowledge that make their
clients especially vulnerable to exploitation. In order to protect clients from abuse, profes-
sions go to great lengths to inculcate norms of professional conduct. This makes professions
an especially important venue for analyzing the e®ect of norms.
In our analysis of physician incentives in a managed care organization with Martin Gaynor
(Gaynor, Rebitzer and Taylor, 2004), we develop a simple model of professional norms that
we adapt here. The model follows the approach used throughout this essay: we modify the
agent's utility function, in this instance to include physicians' regard for their patients. We
posit, in particular, that the socialization of physicians causes them to experience disutility
when they adopt a practice style that delivers medical services that are less than the level
that the patient would select for themselves (if they were as well informed as the physician).
Think of this level of services, mB; as the level (measured here in dollars) that results when
the physician incorporates a patient's own preferences into his utility function.
We write the utility of a physician treating i = 1;:::;n patients as a function of income






where d( ) is a convex function that achieves a maximum when mi is equal to a subjective
\best" levels of care, mi
B; and the ¹i parameters indicate the weight the physician places on
each patient's well-being. Thus physician utility is increasing in both income and services
provided when they adopt a practice style with mi < mi
B: In a fee-for-service environ-
ment where insurers don't try to \manage" the care physicians provide, one would expect
physicians to deliver care at or close to mi
B:
39See also Bewley's (2000) comments on the paper, in which he argues that internal wage comparisons
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Managed care organizations, such as Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), often
try to in°uence physician practice styles through the use of ¯nancial incentives. The man-
aged care organization we studied, for example, adopted a simple incentive strategy designed
to restrict utilization without substantially harming patients: the principal (HMO) o®ered
agents (physicians) a bonus b if total annual medical expenditures fell below a target ¹ m.
The probability that a physician's expenditures on behalf of patients fell below this thresh-
old depended of course on the decisions made on behalf of each patient and also random
factors. The probability of earning the bonus, given expenditures mi and target ¹ m, is given
by the c.d.f. F(¹ m ¡
P
mi).
Giving the physician responsibility for the allocation of resources across a panel of patients
in this way makes sense when physicians have practice norms of the sort characterize in




B)2: In this case the physician's best response to a policy, b and ¹ m is found by
maximizing







This leads to the best response function for the treatment of each patient (i = 1;:::;n):







The extrinsic reward induces the physician to conserve resources on behalf of the HMO,
and if ¹i is the same across all patients, say ¹ (i.e., there is no favoritism), the physician
does so in a sensible way.40 Also, it is easy to con¯rm that if the second order condition










From (31) and (32) we can see that the intrinsic value the physician places on patients
(represented by ¹i) governs the level of expenditures chosen for patients, as well as the
power of the extrinsic incentive to alter chosen expenditures.
In our empirical analysis of internal records in an HMO (Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor,
2004), we found results consistent with the prediction in (32); increased incentive intensity
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led physicians to reduce expenditures on patients. We also found that physicians cut costs
most for outpatient and elective procedures, but not at all for inpatient procedures. Con-
sistent with the model, this suggests that physicians cut costs most where the consequences
for patient welfare were lowest.
Two obvious implications of this treatment of professional norms and incentives merit
mention. First, patients are not necessarily harmed by incentives that impose constraints
on physician actions. Indeed, it is clearly in the interests of patients for their physicians
to allocate resources in a reasonable way, because ultimately patients pay for misallocation
through higher insurance premiums. Second, physician practice norms of the sort speci¯ed
above serve to protect patients from potential abuses introduced by cost-containment incen-
tives, especially if the internalization of patient utility is allocated evenly across patients.
Given the pivotal role of professional norms in protecting clients, it is important that
attention be paid to the ways in which these norms are established and how they might be
undermined. A key example of the latter phenomenon is professional \con°ict of interest."
In health care, drug companies famously used gifts and aggressive marketing to in°uence
the prescribing activities of physicians (Avorn, 2004). Con°icts of interest arise in other
contexts as well. For example, Jackson (2008) observes that in many ¯nancial services
markets (including the market for health insurance), brokers who represent one side of the
transaction are paid by the other side. These arrangements clearly threaten the ability of
brokers to represent the interests of their clients.
Economists have devoted relatively little attention to understanding why practices that
create such obvious con°icts of interest persist in markets where principals greatly depend on
the independent judgement of professionals. An important exception is a provocative set of
articles, Dana and Lowenstein (2003) and Moore and Loewenstein (2004), which argue that
even small gifts can trigger a norm of reciprocity that introduces largely unconscious biases
into professional judgements.41 The fact that these biases are unconscious prevents them
from inducing the negative feelings that otherwise cause professionals to conform to norms of
acceptable behavior. Laboratory experiments suggest that clients who rely on professional
41For evidence that judgements of professionals (and others) can be shaped by unconscious but self-serving
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judgements do not adequately adjust their interpretation of professional advice even when
they are informed that their agents might be biased. Although the evidence for this view
of con°ict of interest is far from de¯nitive, the implications for the successful resolution of
principal agent models in professional settings are both profound and unsettling.42
4.4. Identity
Our discussion of professional norms focused on the idea that physicians might experi-
ence disutility|perhaps profound feelings of discomfort or anxiety|if they deviate from
proscribed behaviors with respect to their clients or patients. This approach to economic so-
ciology is discussed at length in the work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) on \identity."
Here is the key idea:
The term identity is used to describe a person's social category|a person
is a man or a woman, a black or a white, a manager or a worker. The
term identity is also used to describe a person's self-image. It captures how
people feel about themselves, as well as how those feeling depend upon their
actions. In a model of utility, then, a person's identity describes gains and
losses in utility from behavior that conforms or departs from the norms for
particular social categories in particular situations.
This concept of utility is a break with traditional economics, where utility
functions are not situation-dependent, but ¯xed. In our conception, utility
functions can change, because norms of appropriate and inappropriate be-
havior di®er across space and time. Indeed, norms are taught|by parents,
teachers, professors, priests, to name just a few. Psychologists say that
people can internalize norms; the norms become their own and guide their
behavior (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005).
The idea that \category" and \situation" can be fundamental elements in preferences
enormously expands the range of principal agent models. For instance, to the extent that
identity can be manipulated within an organization, identity-based incentives might substi-
tute for extrinsic rewards.43 Just as families and religious communities undertake important
and costly investments to ensure that their children internalize a set of values and practices
consistent with passing on the family or group's social identity, so organizations might make
42Another largely neglected theme in the economics of professional norms is whether these norms are
strengthened or weakened by market competition. Cooper and Rebitzer (2006) argue that competition
between HMOs for patients and providers actually magni¯es the importance of physician practice norms,
and limits the willingness of managed care organizations to control costs via incentive contracts.
43For example, practices at West Point are designed to \inculcate non-economic motives in the cadets
so that they have the same goals as the U.S. Army" (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005), and ¯rm or workgroup
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investments in practices that persuade employees to adopt goals of the organization, and
so mitigate agency problems. These investments are likely to be greatest where ¯nancial
rewards are most costly to the organization, e.g., when performance measures are especially
noisy and where high e®ort (or high e®ort at peak times) is critical to the organization's
success. Investment in identity incentives will also be greatest where inculcating identity is
cheap, and it is reasonable to suppose that imparting identity is cheapest when agents are
young and/or when highly motivated individuals self-select into the organization|an issue
to which we return in Section 5.
The great virtue of identity models is that they are highly °exible and therefore able
to account for behavior that is anomalous from the perspective of simple agency models.
This virtue is a curse, however, when it comes to generating falsi¯able hypotheses for
testing identity models themselves. One way around this problem might be to focus on a
particular relevant social category and seek to understand key norms that can be studied
systematically and characterized in a parsimonious way.
A template for this latter approach can be found in a series of careful and nuanced inves-
tigations of psychological factors that generate gender di®erences in economic behaviors.
For example, work by Babcock and her co-authors, demonstrates a profound gender-based
di®erence in the inclination to initiate negotiation; \women don't ask."44 A simple and
clear demonstration emerges in an experimental study in which subjects are asked to com-
plete a simple task, and are then put in a position in which there is ambiguity with regard
to the payment. In a typical experiment, subjects were told in advance that the payment
would be between three and ten dollars. Then, at the conclusion of the session, the exper-
imenter says, \Here's three dollars. Is three dollars okay?" Eight times as many men as
women asked for more money in this experiment. Even in a variant of the experiment in
which the experimenter provides cues to signal the social acceptability of negotiation (e.g.,
with a prompt, \the exact payment is negotiable"), far more men than women take up the
opportunity (Small, Gelfand, Babcock, and Bettman, 2007).
44Babcock and Laschever (2003) provide an engaging and wide-ranging discussion. The authors present
real-world evidence about women's general disinclination to ask, and they include observations about the
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In laboratory and ¯eld experiments, this disinclination by women to \ask" a®ects out-
comes in negotiated settlements, leading women to do less well than men. Importantly,
though, when a woman advocates on behalf of someone else, she is typically more success-
ful than when she negotiates for herself, and indeed is generally more e®ective than men
in this capacity (Bowles, Babcock, and McGinn, 2006). Part of the reluctance to \ask," it
appears, comes from a desire to avoid self promotion.
Along these same lines, Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) ¯nd that women respond
di®erently than men to tournament style incentives when these contests involve both men
and women. When paid by piece rate or when competing in single sex tournaments, women's
performance is similar to those of men. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) provide experimental
evidence that in comparison to men, women generally shy away from incentives schemes
that involve tournament competition.
Gender identity, in short, matters in economically important ways. It is tempting to
assert that female identity includes a component that guides women to shy away from
competition with men and to reject self promotion. However, it is important to understand
that this might not be the whole story, or even the most important part of the story, when
using identity to explain gender di®erences in behavior. There is considerable evidence in
psychology that a \kinder, gentler image" is expected of women (to use the expression in
Rudman and Glick's 1999 article on the topic). Women who violate that norm by engaging
in self promotion face the potential of backlash, which can entail psychological and material
costs (as when a woman is bypassed for promotion because she is seen as \inappropriately
assertive"). Thus, even a woman who feels no particular disinclination for self promotion
might ¯nd it in her self interest to adopt the expected \kinder, gentler" norm (Bowles,
Babcock, and Lai, 2006).45
45The point here is that individuals are not passive carriers of their social identities and, as Akerlof
and Kranton note, there are many instances in which identities are supported by sometimes severe social
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Standard agency models, discussed in Sections 2 and 3, do have implications for gender
in labor markets.46 The recent work by Babcock, Niederlie, Vesterlund, and their co-
authors, discussed above, adds a new and promising perspective for understanding the role of
gender in organizations and labor markets. Babcock and Lashever (2003) provide extensive
evidence that women's reluctance to ask often includes an unwillingness to negotiate their
own salaries. It follows logically that in labor markets in which there is rent sharing,
this psychological phenomenon contributes to male-female wage and income gaps. On the
other hand, the title to Neiderle and Vesterlund's 2007 paper|\Do Women Shy Away from
Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?"|suggests an important point: Cooperation,
and the willingness to work hard on the behalf of others, are valuable traits, which should
receive positive value in the labor markets. An important research agenda going forward
is the incorporation of new ¯ndings on gender from psychology and behavioral economics
into models of organizations and labor market equilibrium for the purpose of investigating
these very issues.47
There are certainly other important identity categories that deserve attention from be-
havioral economists who study organizations and labor markets. Ethnicity and sexual ori-
entation are additional identity categories that are important in many contexts, including,
quite possibly, the labor market.48 Berman's (2000) economic analysis of ultra-orthodox
46For example, as Bulow and Summers (1984) note, if women generally have lower labor market attach-
ment than men (perhaps because they are more likely to withdraw from the market for bearing and raising
children or elder care), e±ciency wages will be less e®ective in motivating women than in motivating men.
This leads to an equilibrium in which a higher proportion of women than men will end up in the \secondary
sector." As a second example, long-hours work norms that emerge in rat race models, such as those of Lan-
ders, Rebitzer, and Taylor (1996) might be particularly disadvantageous to women. See Landers, Rebitzer,
and Taylor (1997) for a discussion of this latter issue.
47In this essay we focus on the e®ect of gender identity on agency problems, but gender identity is also
likely to be very important for understanding female labor supply. In an intriguing and ingenious study,
Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004), ¯nd that married women are more likely to work outside of the home
if they are married to a man whose mother worked outside the home. A causal link is established by the
use IV estimation, with cross-State variation in male World War II mobilization rates as the instrument.
48In the broad social sphere, Bisin and Verdier's (2000) analysis of ethnic identity and intermarriage
makes a strong prediction that if families value homogamous matches (matches between men and women in
the same ethnic group), minority families will make greater investments in identity-preserving activities than
majority families, because there is a greater chance that their children will enter heterogamous matches. In
a ¯eld study of one workplace, Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2009) document workplace favoritism based
on nationality (presumably because of social connections between those who share language and national
origin) that is costly to the ¯rm. As for sexual orientation, it seems possible that when gay individuals
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Jewish groups indicates a strong behavioral impact of religious identity, which induces many
Israeli ultra-orthodox men to engage in fulltime yeshiva study into their early 40s, thereby
impoverishing themselves and their families.
4.5. Miscommunication and Race
Another identity category of indisputable importance is race. There is little theoretical
work in economics that explores the role of race in organizational form and compensation
practices. A very important exception is Lang's (1986) \language theory" of statistical
discrimination, which focuses squarely on agency and performance within organizations.
The starting point of Lang's analysis is the observation that misunderstanding and mis-
interpretation are common workplace problems. Lang draws on a wide body of literature
in psychology and linguistics to argue that these problems are exacerbated when managers
and workers are from di®erent \cultural" or \linguistic" groups.49
Following Lang's lead, Ritter and Taylor (forthcoming) consider a labor market in which
there is potential for race-based workplace misunderstandings. Their focus is the possibility
that this force contributes to black-white gaps in unemployment. The model of unemploy-
ment is the agency-based e±ciency wage model outlined in Section 2.2.3.
Suppose that most supervisors in the U.S. are white (perhaps because capital is dispro-
portionately in the hands of whites in the U.S.), and that these managers are more successful
evaluating the performance of white employees than black employees. Now recall that in
the e±ciency wage model set out above, ¾ (the standard deviation of the noise) re°ects the
precision with which managers evaluate workers. The logic of Lang's arguments leads to
the conclusion that ¾ is relatively higher when white managers evaluate black workers. If
so, the unemployment rate will be higher for blacks than for whites.
this reduces costs for deviation from traditional norms along other dimensions, such as occupational choice.
Along these lines, Black, et al. (2000) show that during the Korean War era (1950{1954), military service
rates were 12 times higher for lesbian women than other women, and Black, Sanders, and Taylor (2007) show
that lesbian college graduates sort into traditionally male majors at substantially higher rates than other
women. We know of no work in economics that explores implications for organizations and labor markets.
49See also the excellent discussion by Cornell and Welch (1996). The idea that minority individuals
might be more di±cult to assess than non-minority workers is of course also at the root of the classic work
on statistical discrimination. (See, e.g., Arrow, 1998, for references to earlier literature, and a thoughtful
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To see the logic of the Ritter-Taylor result, recall, from (23), that in an economy with
homogenous workers, an e±ciency wage strategy of worker motivation leads to the following
relationship between the equilibrium wage (wE) and unemployment rate (uE):









Now suppose that black and white workers are equally productive and thus in equilibrium
must be paid the same wage. Suppose also that, as discussed in the last paragraph, there
is more noise in the evaluation of black workers than white workers: ¾B > ¾W: Then the


















where uB is the unemployment rate for black workers and uW is the unemployment rate for
white individuals. Clearly, uB > uW: We therefore have a potential explanation for racial
di®erences in unemployment rates.
This model is thus consistent with evidence, such as Neal's (2006), that among men, black-
white gaps in the wage are small when one conditions on a measurement of human capital
taken when the men were youths (the AFQT), but black-white gaps in unemployment are
large. Ritter and Taylor (forthcoming) show that black-white unemployment gaps persist
when one conditions on the AFQT, and that unemployment rates are highest for black
men who attended high schools in which other students were mostly black. Under the
assumption that these men are most likely to ¯nd on-the-job interactions with their boss
di±cult, this evidence is consistent with the model of racial di®erences in unemployment
we have just outlined.50
The \miscommunication model of unemployment" outlined above calls attention to a
general point that pertains broadly in models of behavioral agency: If the e±cient resolution
to agency problems is economically important, than labor markets will tend to reward
50Grogger (2009) provides another piece of evidence consistent with the idea that impediments to black-
white interactions spill over into the labor market. Even when he controls for skill and family background,
blacks with speech patterns that sound distinctively black (according to anonymous listeners) are found to
be relatively less successful in the labor market.
Even so, the miscommunication story we have outlined is likely a modest part of the profound racial
divide in the U.S., as indicated by the black-white gap in unemployment and labor force participation, as
well as many other economic and social dimensions.56 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
individuals who possess scarce preferences and traits that enhance the e®ectiveness of ¯rms'
strategies to evaluate, monitor, and provide incentives. Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001)
o®er a creative assessment of the labor market returns to such incentive-enhancing traits|
traits that might include include a low rate of time preference, an intense sense of shame
at being without work, perseverance, identi¯cation with work goals, and the psychological
predisposition to see personal initiative and self determination as important relative to
external luck or fate (i.e., to have \internal control" rather than \external control" on
Rotter's \locus of control").
Bowles, et al. (2001) o®er an overview of empirical evidence that wages are correlated with
measures of some such traits. For example, people with a high degree of internal control
earn higher wages.51 Of course, correlation does not establish causality, and the Rotter
measure may simply stand in for on-the-job productivity. Still, the authors persuasively
argue that incentive-enhancing traits can matter for labor market outcomes, and may be
important for understanding the large amount of unexplained variation typically observed
in estimated wage regressions.
A number of recent theoretical papers in behavioral economics explore the implications of
heterogeneity in agent traits along some key dimension (identi¯cation with the task, degree
to which the agent is pro-social, etc.). In Section 5 below we discuss several of these papers.
In each case the distribution of traits as taken to be exogenous|a reasonable approach given
the goals in each paper. But, of course, in the broader scheme, many of these key traits
are shaped by individuals' home and school environments. This latter point is developed
in the seminal work of Bowles and Gintis (1977), who argue that if the education system is
to be successful in preparing students for the labor market, the objective function ought to
include the development of both cognitive skills and incentive-enhancing behaviors.
5. Dual-Purpose Incentives: Can Pay Destroy Intrinsic Motivation?
In Section 3 we discussed dual-purpose incentives as they arise in conventional models of
extrinsic rewards, noting that they arise in many contexts, including the use of compensation
51Similarly, Ritter and Taylor (forthcoming) use the Rotter measure as a control in one of their unem-
ployment regressions, ¯nding that men with high internal control (measured when they are young) have
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practices to signal some otherwise-unobserved characteristic of the ¯rm, to avoid adverse
selection of workers along some otherwise-unobserved characteristic, and to deal with multi-
tasking. We return in this section to the study of incentives that must do \double duty,"
but now the second role concerns intrinsic motives.
5.1. Pay and Selection on Dedication
To set the stage, we begin with an extremely simple model in which increasing pay
induces adverse selection along an important dimension|dedication to the job. Our case
considers a group of workers who are quali¯ed for a particular occupation that for many
is a \calling" or \vocation." There are many examples of this sort of dedication: religious
ministry, policy advocacy, nursing, early childhood education, public-interest law, etc. The
\calling" in this case is a potentially important form of intrinsic motivation. In this section
we take a vocational inclination to be an unobserved feature of preferences. In subsequent
sections, however, we allow for the possibility that the intensity of an agent's \calling"
might be reinforced or eroded by the behavior of the principal or peers.
Speci¯cally, we consider the model set up by Heyes (2005) and analyzed further by one of
us (Taylor, 2007). The analysis, which uses the market for nurses as the focus of discussion,
begins with simple behavioral assumptions. There are L quali¯ed nurses, each of whom falls
into two categories: (i) A proportion of these nurses, 1 ¡ ¼; view nursing as simply a job.
These individuals receive utility equal to their wage, w; and they produce value qL on the
job. (ii) The remaining proportion, ¼; is comprised of nurses who view work as a \vocation."
They provide higher-quality nursing along an unobservable dimension, qH > qL: They also
¯nd their work ful¯lling, and thus earn money metric utility m beyond the earned wage w.
Each individual has a reservation wage r which is drawn from a log concave p.d.f., f(r),
that has a corresponding c.d.f., F(r). The function f( ) is assumed to be the same for both
types of worker. Thus, at wage w, the quantity of nursing labor supplied is
(35) ~ L(w) = [¼F(w + m) + (1 ¡ ¼)F(w)]L;
and the average quality is of nursing care is
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where µ is the proportion of employed nurses for whom nursing is a vocation, i.e.,
(37) µ =
¼F(w + m)
¼F(w + m) + (1 ¡ ¼)F(w)
:
Heyes' key insight is that this latter proportion is declining in the wage.52 Thus, the higher
the wage, the lower will be the quality of services provided.
Consider an employer acting in isolation, e.g., a monopsonistic National Health Service
(NHS), that hires nurses. (In di®erent markets one could think of the Roman Catholic
church setting wages for priests or nuns, or Habitat for Humanity setting wages for profes-
sional builders who take part-time positions constructing a®ordable housing.) Heyes shows
that an employer who understands the adverse selection properties of high wages will set the
wage to be lower than would otherwise be chosen. Thus, an NHS that maximizes surplus
generated by nurses will operate with an apparent \shortage" of nursing, in the sense that
the expected net value of product will be positive for the marginal nurse.
It is possible indeed that the principal will be driven to a corner solution, with pay set to
zero. Thus, Habitat for Humanity has the well-known policy of using unpaid volunteers for
many key tasks. Organization that seek to remedy injustice in the legal system often rely
on pro bono attorney services. Historically, many religious workers take a \vow of poverty,"
accepting compensation at near-subsistence levels. The idea, of course, is that the lower
the pay, the higher will be the dedication level of individuals willing to adopt the vocation.
Taylor (2007) extends Heyes' analysis to show that a monopsonist that seeks to maximize
surplus generated by workers will always set the wage lower than the socially e±cient
level. The reason is that the monopsonist fails to take account of the surplus generated to
those individuals who view their work as a vocation. Because wages are too low, too few
vocationally-oriented workers end up in an occupation in which they create the greatest
social value.
On the other hand, a parallel analysis in Taylor (2007) shows that if the labor market
is perfectly competitive, the equilibrium wage will be ine±ciently high. To see how this
happens, notice that under the assumption that all workers must be paid the same wage, a
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social planner would want to maximize
(38) ¼
·













where r is taken to be the value of the worker in some other capacity (with ¹ r being the
highest value in the distribution). Maximization of (38) leads to the wage being set to be
the weighted sum,
(39) w¤ = ^ µqH + (1 ¡ ^ µ)qL; with ^ µ =
·
¼f(w + m)
¼f(w + m) + (1 ¡ ¼)f(w)
¸
:
Next notice that in a competitive market the wage instead will equal average productivity,
(40) wc = ~ µqH + (1 ¡ ~ µ)qL; with ~ µ =
·
¼F(w + m)
¼F(w + m) + (1 ¡ ¼)F(w)
¸
:
Using the property of log concavity given in footnote 52, we can compare wages in (39) and
(40), ¯nding that wc > w¤. The problem with the competitive market is that each ¯rm
makes hiring decisions on the basis of average market productivity. A social planner would
instead make decisions on the basis of the productivity of the marginal worker, i.e., would
take account of the fact that as the wage increases in the market, the productivity of the
marginal worker declines.
This simple model serves as a ¯rst illustration of an important point that reappears
throughout this section of our essay: Pay policies can a®ect intrinsic motivation, often in
surprising ways. Here, high pay reduces intrinsic motivation in a workforce in a particularly
transparent way. Low-pay environments attract workers for whom the job is a vocation|
workers who have an intrinsic inclination to provide high-quality service. The higher the
pay, the greater will be the proportion of workers for whom the job is simply a job, i.e.,
workers who will provide lower-quality service.
A particularly interesting feature of this simple behavioral model is that markets can
lead to wages being either too high or too low relative to an e±cient benchmark, depending
on the market's structure. To see the logic of this point, consider this question: \If you
were a falsely convicted death-row inmate, would you rather be in a State in which you
must rely on an organization that reviews cases using pro bono attorney services, or in a
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pro bono services, attorneys who work on death-penalty cases will be highly dedicated to
justice, and will provide excellent legal aid, but that aid will be in short supply. In contrast,
in a State that purchases legal services for death-row inmates, access to attorneys may be
more extensive, but those attorneys will have a lower expected level of dedication. Our
model shows that in the State that relies on pro bono attorneys, the wage is too low and
the quality level too high relative to the e±cient benchmark. But in the State that uses the
competitive market, the wage is too high and the quality too low. Theory alone does not
identify the socially preferred second-best outcome.
Recently, a number of papers have examined models in which agents di®er in their level
of intrinsic motivation. Delfgaauw and Dur (2007), for example, have a wage posting model
in which a monopsonist faces the same tension discussed above: the higher the posted
wage, the higher the probability of ¯lling a vacancy, but the lower the expected motivation
level of workers who apply. In their model, workers have private information about their
utility|information which they may wish to signal to or conceal from an employer. Besley
and Ghatak (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) study public sector employment under
the assumption that some agents have a \public service motivation" that takes the form of
intrinsic value derived from making a contribution to one's organization.53
The model we have examined in this section omits, obviously, several relevant issues that
merit further consideration. For instance, the set-up abstracts from the core problem of
agency; workers are simply assumed to supply e®ort on the basis of their internal intrinsic
values. Second, workers are assumed to be steadfast; motivation is not a®ected by the
actions of those around them. Thus, a worker who is inclined to provide high quality service
is not de-motivated when she is surrounded by others who provide low quality service. In
short, the analysis abstracts from \social preferences" of the sort discussed in Section 4.
Third, the model does not take account of the possibility that a worker's motivation can
be a®ected by attributions the agent might place on the intentions of the principal. It is
53See also Prendergast (2007), who sets out a model in which there is variation in the degree to which
agents care about the outcome of some action they might take, as when bureaucrats vary in the extent to
which they have altruism and empathy for individuals they are serving. One example he develops concerns
social workers hired to determine eligibility for public assistance programs. While a \client-serving ethic" is
important for this occupation generally, that same trait may be an impediment for the bureaucratic task at
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easy to see that such attributions might be germane, though, in the case of the \service
motivations" we have been discussing.54 Finally, the set-up does not allow for the possibility
that a worker's intrinsic motivation (m in the model above) can be reinforced or undermined
by pay policies. We turn next to models that take up such issues.
5.2. Social Preferences, Conformism, and the Principal's Use of Extrinsic Rewards
Recent work by Sliwka (2007) considers the question of agency in a model that draws
on a \social preference framework," i.e., allows for agents' motivation to be shaped in part
on the behavior of those around them. As in the model set out in the last section, there
is heterogeneity in worker motivation, and an agent's motivational inclinations are initially
hidden to the principal and to other agents. There are two types of \steadfast" agents. One
type is \strictly sel¯sh;" these are agents who care only about their own payo®. Agents of the
second type are \fair" in the sense that they care about the wellbeing of others; speci¯cally,
for these agents, utility is increasing in the principal's payo®. The key innovation is to
assume that there is yet a third group, \conformists," whose inclination toward fairness
depends the values of those around them. To keep matters simple, Sliwka assumes that
when a conformist learns what agent type is in the majority, the conformist behaves like
the majority-type agent.
In this set-up, a principal who understands that most of his steadfast workers are fair,
might be able to use compensation policies as a credible signal to \conformists." In turn,
if conformists believe that others around them are \fair" they behave like fair agents.
To see how this works, we set up a simple example similar to that developed by Sliwka.
In our example, the principal ¯rst posts a policy that speci¯es wage as a function of ef-
fort (which is assumed to be observable ex post), w(e). An agent's best response to the
announced policy depends, of course, on his preferences over e®ort and money, and those






2 for a steadfast sel¯sh agent, and
w(e) ¡ e2
2 + ¹¼ for a steadfast fair agent,
54For example, when an organization hires motivated agents to pursue some jointly-shared social goal,
agents must believe that they indeed are advancing that goal. Presumably, religiously-oriented individuals
will be demoralized if they discover that are working for a corrupt church. See, e.g., Besley and Ghatak
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where ¹ re°ects a fair agent's level of identi¯cation with the principal's objective (with
0 < ¹ < 1).
We assume that the principal sets compensation to have a ¯xed component and a \bonus"
that is a linear function of e®ort, w(e) = w0 + ¯e: Given that types are unobserved, the
principal's posted wage-bonus policy applies to all agents. It is easy to see that for an
announced compensation policy, best responses are




¯ for a steadfast sel¯sh agent, and
(1 ¡ ¹)¯ + ¹ for a steadfast fair agent.
With this in mind, consider a pro¯t-maximizing principal who earns surplus
(43) ¼ = e ¡ w(e)
for a given agent. Given the best responses in (42), it is clear that e®ort is increasing in
the incentive intensity; ^ e0(¯) > 0 for both types of steadfast agent. Su±ciently high e®ort-
contingent bonuses would seem to be in order.55 Remarkably, it might nonetheless be in
the principal's best interest instead to set ¯ equal to 0 and increase the baseline wage, i.e.,
to rely solely on low-powered incentives.
The key is the emergence of a separating equilibrium in which conformists become con-
vinced that most steadfast agents are fair. It is assumed that the ¯rm has private informa-
tion about the proportion of steadfast agents who belong to each type, which for simplicity
is taken to have a low value or a high value. It is a matter of simple algebra to con¯rm that
there are parameter values for which the following holds: If the ¯rm has a low number of
fair agents, it pays a high bonus, ¯ > 0; and a low wage. If the ¯rm has a high number of
fair agents, it pays no bonus, ¯ = 0; and a relatively higher wage, i.e., it uses low-powered
incentives. Here low-powered incentives serve as a credible signal, so conformists follow suit
and behave like fair agents. This makes sense, because a principal who has a high fraction
of steadfast fair agents will incur a smaller loss than a principal with a low fraction of fair
agents when it sets the bonus to 0. A willingness by the principal to raise the ¯xed wage
55With perfect information, the bonus would be ¯S =
1




2(1¡¹) < ¯S for
a fair agent. Ideally, the principal prefers a larger bonus for a sel¯sh agent, but will want to have a positive
bonus for fair agents as well as long as ¹ <
1
2. Notice also that fair agents have \intrinsic motives;" they
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further strengthens the signal. Conformists, in response to this credible signal, behave like
fair agents. Pro¯t for this ¯rm is higher than if it used higher-powered incentives.
The operating logic of the model is like the Taylor-Ritter model discussed in Section 3.1,
in which the ¯rm uses compensation policy to signal hidden information about itself (i.e.,
the ¯rm's ¯nancial ¯tness). In that model, low-powered incentives signal relatively good
¯nancial ¯tness, which allows the ¯rm increased pro¯tability.56 Here, the principal's hidden
information is the mix of worker type. There is a cost to low-powered incentives, of course,
as e®ort is set by all agents to be less than ¯rst-best. But the low-powered incentive
persuades some workers|the \conformists"|to behave in an altruistic fashion, when they
would otherwise have not.
Sliwka interprets his model as generating \trust as a signal of a social norm." In Silwka's
setting, the principal observes e®ort and can, if he chooses, condition rewards on e®ort. By
setting no explicit incentives, the principal expresses trust in his workers. This trust directs
a social norm. Some workers are more generous in their e®orts than they would have been
if they perceived a di®erent norm.
The most intriguing possibility in the Sliwka's model is that monetary incentives crowd
out intrinsic motivation. If a ¯rm moves from a \high trust" low-powered incentive scheme
to a \low trust" high-powered incentive scheme, the ¯rm shifts the norm and undermines
the intrinsic portion of worker's motivation (the \social component" in the utility of a
worker who would otherwise behave as a \fair agent"). Sliwka develops his theory further
by looking at employee self-selection into ¯rms. Here again, low-powered incentives can
serve to attract workers with high intrinsic motives (fair agents), which serves to reinforce
the positive work norms that in°uence those who conform to others.
The key behavioral underpinning of the Sliwka model is the observation that many people
seem to want to conform to those around them. As we have noted, there is considerable
evidence about the key component of this story|that many people are in°uenced by norms.
For example, some individuals feel bad about a particular action only in situations in which
56Similar logic pertains in Spier's (1992) model, in which a principal knows more about the pro¯tability
and riskiness of a project than does an agent, and in Allen and Gale (1992), in which a supplier has superior
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they think others would experience remorse for that same action.57 In previous sections
of this paper, we cited empirical work supportive of the social forces that create norms,
e.g., studies by Ichino and Maggi (2000), in which worker absenteeism in an Italian bank
was a®ected by the absenteeism of those around them, and Mas and Moretti (2009), in
which e®ort by supermarket checkout workers was a®ected by other similar workers in
their sightline. Yet another study, by Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2009), shows that
the productivity of farm workers is a®ected by the productivity of friends on the job.
Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) document peer learning for teachers, which might be read
as providing additional evidence on conformity to norms. Of course, considerably more
empirical work will be required to know if conformism plays a su±ciently strong role to
generate in real-world organizations the crowding out of intrinsic motivation predicted by
the Sliwka model.
5.3. Extrinsic Incentives when Agents Value the Principal's Esteem
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) present a model that, like Sliwka's, relies on social
preferences. Also, like Sliwka's, their model opens up the possibility that extrinsic incentives
can undermine valuable intrinsic motivations.
The key innovation in the Ellingsen-Johannesson model is the postulate that human
motivation is often rooted in social esteem|the desire to be well regarded by others. In
this conception, an agent reasons as follows: \I wish for others to hold a high opinion of me.
While I cannot know with certainty what others think of me, I do have beliefs about what
others think, and these beliefs about others' opinions are an important source of pleasure
or discomfort." The identity of the audience that the agent wishes to impress plays a
key role in this model, and the agent might well have multiple audiences. For example, a
college professor might care about opinions of her students, her dean, other professors in
her department, and/or colleagues in the profession more generally. She desires the respect
of the intended audience(s), i.e., gains utility if she believes that others think highly of her.
57There is a great deal of empirical work across disciplines on norms. One particularly evocative story
is told by Fisman and Miguel (2007): When United Nations diplomats in New York were given immunity
for parking violations, violations were much higher among diplomats from countries that have high levels of
corruption than from countries that have low levels of corruption. This suggests a powerful role for cultural
norms. At a theoretical level, work by Bernheim (1994) is important. Fischer and Huddart (2008) discusses
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Ellingsen and Johannesson focus on the case in which the relevant audience to an agent
is the principal.58 To simplify use of personal pronouns, we let the principal be male and
the agent be female. In the model, then, the agent's utility depends on the \respect" she
earns from the principal, which is de¯ned to be her beliefs about his beliefs about her.
A simple example shows how the desire to earn respect can a®ect an agent's e®ort deci-
sions.59 Suppose there are two types of agent, \talented" and \untalented," and type is not
initially observable to the principal. An agent hired by a principal is paid an agreed-upon
wage w; and then chooses any e®ort level she likes, e ¸ 0: We suppose that her utility is the
sum of three components: (1) compensation w, (2) the cost of e®ort, which is ¡c1e for a
talented worker and ¡c2e for an untalented worker, with c2 > c1 > 0, and (3) \respect" of
the principal, which has value rp(e); where r is a positive constant and p(e) is the agent's






w ¡ c1e + rp(e) for a talented agent, and
w ¡ c2e + rp(e) for an untalented agent.
Now, given (44), an untalented agent is clearly better o® supplying e®ort 0 than supply
e®ort greater than r
c2; even if the higher e®ort level would \earn maximum respect" (i.e.,
would induce the principal to believe with probability 1 that the agent is talented). So we
have a separating equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion if a talented agent supplies
e®ort r
c2; which is just high enough so that the untalented agent will decline to mimic.60
In this example, a talented agent provides positive e®ort. She is not motivated by her
own material wellbeing, as she would be in a standard principal agent model. Nor is
she motivated by an innate desire to see the principal's wellbeing improve, as with the
other-regarding preferences assumed in the Sliwka model (or other such models discussed in
58Kandel and Lazear's (1992) important work on peer pressure, in contrast, focuses on the case in which
an agent values the regard of co-workers.
59The example set out here follows Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007).
60For such an equilibrium to exist, we need for the di®erence between c2 and c1 to be large enough to
support separate actions by the two types. Suppose it is common knowledge that proportion ¼ of agents
are talented. If all agents were to supply e = 0; agents would earn respect r¼: But in such a proposed
equilibrium, it would be worth it to a maverick talented agent to play e =
r
c2; and thereby earn respect r;
only if r ¡ c1
r
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Section 4). She provides e®ort because by so doing she can be con¯dent that the principal
holds a high opinion of her. Put another way, she is motivated by social esteem|the desire
to earn respect.
With this basic logic in place, we can set out the The Ellingsen-Johannesson model of
principal-agent interaction. The model is built around three components. First, agents and
principals hold social preferences. They care about their own material wellbeing as well
as well as the material wellbeing of others. Second, there is unobserved heterogeneity in
the extent to which agents and principals value others' wellbeing. In particular there are
two types on people, who vary in the extent to which they are pro-social. Third, and most
distinctively, both the agent and the principal are motivated by social esteem, so the agent
cares about what the principal thinks about her, and the principal cares about what the
agent thinks of him. Both want to be thought of as pro-social by the other. Moreover,
the agent's concern about the principal's opinion is highest if she thinks highly of him, i.e.,
believes it is likely that he is highly pro-social. Similarly, the principal places greater weight
on the agent's opinion if he believes that she is highly pro-social.
With these assumptions in place, Ellingsen and Johannesson examine the equilibrium of
a game in which the principal takes an initial action (e.g., makes a wage o®er, or makes a
decision about how much discretion to allow the agent in her work), and then the agent takes
an action which a®ects both her material wellbeing and the principal's wellbeing. As in the
simpler example in the preceding paragraphs, there is a set of parameters on preferences
and the distribution of types such that a separating equilibrium emerges that satis¯es the
Intuitive Criterion. In that equilibrium a pro-social principal can take a credible action that
signals that he is pro-social, and, if she is su±ciently pro-social, the agent responds with an
action that bene¯ts the principal. The key driving behavioral force is that a pro-social agent
wishes to be highly regarded by a pro-social principal. Having learned that the principal is
pro-social, the agent takes a pro-social action herself as a means of securing the knowledge
that the principal believes her to indeed be a pro-social individual.
Figure 2 provides a nice illustration of the behavior predicted in this model. The game
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In Case 1, the ¯rst player (the principal) can choose \not trust" (NT), which leads to
payo®s (20, 20) for the principal and agent respectively, or \trust" (T), which accords
discretion to the agent. If the the principal plays T, the agent can reward the trust (R),
giving payo®s (25, 25) or not (N), giving payo®s (15, 30). With conventional preferences,
the subgame perfect equilibrium is clearly \not trust." However, in the McCabe-Rigdon-
Smith experiments, many principals chose T, and most agents responded by rewarding such
trust by playing R.
In Case 2, the principal has no choice but to play T. In contrast to Case 1, here most
agents responded by playing N. Thus, the intentionality of the principal's trust appears to
matter for the agent's response.
The Ellingsen-Johannesson model provides a rationale for these observed outcomes in
the trust game. Start with Case 1. There are parameters in the model such that two key
conditions are met. First, the principal will play T only if he is su±ciently pro-social, i.e.,
only if he cares su±ciently about the wellbeing of the agent. Second, a pro-social agent,
having received a credible signal that the principal is pro-social, cares su±ciently about the
respect of the principal that she in turn takes the action R, con¯rming that she is pro-social.
In contrast, in Case 2 the principal has no opportunity to signal that he is pro-social. In
turn, the agent cares less about his respect, and so she plays N.
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) show, using similar logic, that their model predicts
behavior consistent with Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) experimental evidence on the hidden
\cost of control" in a principal agent game. In the Falk-Kosfeld game, agents are given an
endowment of 120 and can transfer x · 120 to the principal, who in turn receives payo® 2x;
thus resulting in payo®s (2x;120¡x). The important twist is that in some conditions of the
game, there is a ¯rst stage in which the principal can play \control" by imposing a minimum
transfer (e.g., a transfer of 10) from the the agent to the principal, or can choose instead to
\trust." Agents motivated solely by material gain would always play the minimum available
x; and knowing this, the principal would always \control" to the maximum extent allowed.
But, in fact, consistent with the Ellingsen-Johannesson set-up, many principals sent a signal
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such cases many agents responded with larger values of x that if the principal had played
\control."
One nice way to see the distinctive contribution of the \esteem model" is to view it in
the context of Akerlof's (1982) concept of gift exchange. Recall that in Akerlof's model
(discussed above in Section 4.2), an agent's best response to a su±ciently generous \gift"
by the principal is to reciprocate by providing high e®ort. The agent's motivation to do
so is captured in a clear, but stripped down fashion|with a utility function in which the
agent experiences disutility only when her e®ort level exceeds a psychologically determined
threshold (the e®ort \norm"). Ellingsen and Johnnesson take an additional step, positing
an explicitly speci¯ed behavioral mechanism (\esteem") that drives this motivation. This
approach, the authors show, allows them to predict gift exchange behavior. But there are
two advantages to the Ellingsen-Johannesson model:
First, the model gives a clear way of understanding the role of a principal's intentions
in shaping agents' responses. This is important, given experimental evidence (such as
Charness, 2004) that intentionality is important to understanding gift exchange.
Second, the model provides a rigorous way of approaching an important and under-
appreciated aspect of principal agent problems as they apply in the workplace|the delega-
tion of decision rights. Essentially, the delegation of consequential actions to agents plays
the role of a \gift" here, and provides the agent with the opportunity to earn the respect
of the principal. In contrast, highly intrusive job design diminishes intrinsic motivation.
These ideas are potentially valuable for understanding otherwise-inexplicable practices
within organizations. For example, charitable organizations like Habitat for Humanity
often rely on volunteers who receive little on no pay, and then delegate key decisions to
these same individuals. By providing low pay, we have suggested (in Section 5.1 above),
the organization is less likely to attract opportunists. The the \esteem model" shows
the important advantages to relinquishing bureaucratic control. A second example is the
widespread use of \psychological contracts" (Rousseau, 1995) in which contracting parties
¯nd it advantageous to leave many elements unspeci¯ed, relying instead on mutual goodwill.
Conversely, the esteem model indicates why high pay and clearly delineated direction
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leads agents to have intrinsic motivation that works at cross purposes to the principal. For
example, very strong ¯nancial incentives might be required to induce a physician to cut
costs if the physician values the esteem of her patients more than the esteem of her boss
(e.g., the managed care organization she works for).61
5.4. Extrinsic Rewards and Reputation
The Ellingsen-Johannesson model we have just discussed is one of a number of recent
papers that focus on the interaction of pro-social motivation and reputation or esteem.
This literature starts with the observation that people undertake altruistic and reciprocal
actions (in the workplace and elsewhere), but recognizes that such behavior is often di±cult
to rationalize solely by other-regrading preferences. The degree to which people undertake
pro-social behavior often depends on the social context and economic environment, and is
driven in part by the desire to be highly regarded by others.
An important contribution to this literature is the recent work of B¶ enabou and Tirole
(2006). Among the remarkable insights of this paper is a clear demonstration that extrinsic
rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation when people care about reputation.
Consider the following anecdote: One of us has a particularly personable colleague who
was asked by the dean to accept a somewhat onerous task|advising masters students|that
would have high value to his colleagues. In exchange, the dean o®ered a $2000 bonus. The
professor replied that it was certainly not worth taking on the task for $2000, but that he
would be willing to do the job for free!
To demonstrate how the B¶ enabou and Tirole approach explains the behavior of this
public-spirited professor, we set up a simpli¯ed case of their more general model. We
suppose that a principal asks agents to undertake a pro-social activity by providing e®ort
61Quite possibly, carefully constructed models of esteem formation can make predictions about the in-
teraction between organizational design and society's class structure. Esteem motives, after all, break down
if the principal is not a member of the audience, i.e., the class of individuals whose respect the agent val-
ues. Thus, if female identity is formed in a way that leads women to especially value the esteem of men,
male bosses would have a distinct advantage over female bosses when supervising women. Bosses in high
positions in racial hierarchies, ethnic hierarchies, or other socially determine hierarchies would be similarly
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e = 1. The agent can decline, instead providing e = 0: The agent's e®ort choice is observable
by all, including members of an audience who's opinion matters to the agent.62
The agent's e®ort decision is assumed to a®ect his utility via four channels, which for
simplicity are taken to be additive: (1) The agent is other-regarding, and so earns direct
utility, vee; from providing e®ort e; (2) he stands to earn a material reward in the form of
a bonus of b ¸ 0, which provides utility vmbe (where vm is the marginal utility of money);
(3) he faces an e®ort cost of ce; and, most distinctively, (4) he stands to gain from the
reputation-enhancing e®ect of his e®ort choice.
Central to the B¶ enabou-Tirole model are the following two assumptions, which drive
development of \reputation." First, people di®er in the extent to which they have other-
regarding inclinations, and in the extent to which they value money. So each individual's
set of preference parameters, ve and vm; is drawn from a known distribution.63 An agent's
preference type can be thought of as his or her \identity." Second, reputation is taken to
be other's views of one's own identity. This reputation is increasing in the degree to which
one is seen as having concern for others (having a high value of ve) and decreasing in the
degree to which he is seen as materialistic (having a high value of vm).64 Thus, reputation
is taken to be R(e;b) = ¹eE[veje;b]¡¹wE[vmje;b]; where ¹e and ¹w are weights that re°ect






ve + vmb ¡ c + R(1;b) if e = 1 and
R(0;b) if e = 0:
So our agent provides e®ort if
(46) ve + vmb + [R(1;b) ¡ R(0;b)] > c:
62To simply matters, suppose that the agent is already in the principal's employ and is now being asked
to undertake a task that was not originally part of the job (as in the example of the public-spirited professor).
It would be a worthwhile task to apply the B¶ enabou-Tirole model in a labor market generally (which would
require attention to participation constraints, and to the way in which an announced compensation policy
might a®ect selection into a ¯rm).
63To keep things simple here, we suppose that the parameters are independent.
64Concern for others (\kindness") and moderation in materialistic pursuit (\temperance") are but two of
the seven virtues. By leaving the other ¯ve virtues unstudied, perhaps B¶ enabou and Tirole signal \patience"
(leaving them for future work) and \humility" (deference to other behavioral economists who wish to study
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The three terms on the left-hand side of (46) are, respectively, the agent's intrinsic, extrinsic,
and reputational motivations. E®ort is provided when the sum of these motivations exceeds
the cost of providing e®ort.
What makes matters interesting here is that the reputation the agent earns depends
on the level of the bonus b chosen by the principal. To see this point, consider ¯rst the
e®ort decision if the principal chooses b = 0, so that motivation is strictly intrinsic and
reputational. Then the agent provides e®ort only if his \concern for others" exceeds the
cut-o® ^ ve; where
(47) ^ ve ´ c ¡ [R(1;0) ¡ R(0;0)]:
Such highly pro-social identity types lie to the right of the vertical \No Bonus" line in
Figure 3. Notice that in this situation the agent's audience can draw an informative inference
about the agent's ve (i.e., can infer if the agent is in an other-regarding pool to the right of
^ ve or narcissistic pool to the left of ^ ve) simply by observing the e®ort level, but can learn
nothing about his materialism vm.
Now suppose that the principal provides a bonus b. For the moment, ignore any impact
on reputation. The bonus has no e®ect on an agent with vm = 0; of course, but for all
other agents (those with vm > 0) the bonus is motivating. Agents now provide e®ort if
they have an identity that lies to the right of the negatively sloped line marked \Positive
Bonus (b > 0), Unadjusted for Reputation." Absent reputational e®ects, an extrinsic reward
expands the pool of agents providing e®ort.
However, this is not the end of the story. Inspection of Figure 3 makes it is clear that
the average level of ve (concern for others) has declined in the pool of agents providing
e®ort and also in the pool of agents not providing e®ort. It is similarly clear that the
average level of vm (greed) has risen for the pool of those providing e®ort and declined for
the pool not providing e®ort. So the overall e®ect on reputation is ambiguous. The most
interesting possibility is that the e®ect of the bonus is to drag down overall reputation for
those providing e®ort. This is demotivating. In Figure 3 this is illustrated by the parallel
shift to the right in the sloped line dividing those who provide e®ort and those who do not,
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horizontal axis (i.e., for individuals with vm = 0). On net, e®ects of the bonus are two-
fold: Some identity types|those in Area A of Figure 3|switch behavior to providing e®ort.
Others|those in Area B|are induced to switch from e®ort provision to not providing e®ort.
Overall, an extrinsic reward can increase or decrease e®ort, depending on the distribution
of identity types.
The public-spirited professor in our anecdote is apparently an individual with an identity
of the sort represented by Area B. Such a person has a relatively high concern for others
and a relatively low level of greed. By o®ering a bonus for the task, the dean deprived the
professor of the opportunity for the professor to demonstrate his public spiritedness.
In short, in the B¶ enabou-Tirole model, extrinsic rewards can spoil the reputational value
pro-social action, thereby crowding out intrinsic motivation. The logic of the model is one
of \signal extraction." People take pro-social actions in part to signal one's own identity
to others. Extrinsic rewards, even very small extrinsic rewards, can serve to increase the
noise-to-signal ratio of such actions.65
One of the most interesting ideas in the B¶ enabou and Tirole model appears when the
authors reinterpret the \reputational" terms in (46) to instead be the reinforcement of one's
own self image. The idea is described as follows:
When making a decisions a®ecting others' welfare, an individual will often
engage in a self-assessment: \How important is it for me to contribute to the
public good? How much do I care about money? What are my real values?"
Later on, however, this information may no longer be perfectly \accessible"
in memory|in fact, there will often be strong incentives to recall it in a self-
serving way. Actions, by contrast, are much easier to remember than their
underlying motives, making it rational to de¯ne oneself partly through one's
past choices: \I am the kind of person who behaves in this way" (B¶ enabou
and Tirole, 2006).
Thus, the public-spirited professor might have found the o®er of a $2000 bonus to be
demotivating even if his colleagues were unaware of the bonus. Accepting the task without
pay, in this conception, served to reinforce his identity; the professor can look at himself in
65Indeed, in more general versions of their model, B¶ enabou and Tirole show that extrinsic rewards can
reverse the sign of the signal! Armed with this logic, the authors establish interesting and surprising insights
around the use of non-monetary motivators as praise and shame. They show, for example, that the excessive
use of praise can back¯re if pro-social behavior \becomes suspected of being motivated by appearances."
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the mirror and argue convincingly, \I must be a pro-social person. Otherwise I wouldn't
have taken on this task with no pay."66
The striking prediction that extrinsic rewards can crowd out desired behaviors does have
empirical support. One widely cited example in economics is work by Gneezy and Rustichini
(2000b) showing that the imposition of a monetary penalty for late child pick-up at a daycare
center increased the likelihood of late pick-up. B¶ enabou and Tirole's reputation/self-respect
model strikes us as applicable here. When there was no explicit monetary penalty for on-
time pick-up, parents were presumably motivated by genuine concern for daycare center
workers and by a desire to project to others (or to oneself) character traits of responsibility or
concern for others. The imposition of a monetary penalty of course increased the inclination
for on-time pick-up among those parents with a materialistic orientation and a low level
of concern for others. This very fact led parents more generally to no longer view on-time
pick-up as a reliable signal of kind and responsible identity, and so reduced the strength
of those motivating forces. Similar arguments apply to Gneezy and Rustichini's (2000b)
demonstration that extrinsic incentives reduced e®ort by school children collecting donations
for a charitable organization.67
Evidence of a potentially important form of crowding out is also found also in Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee's (1997) analysis of public reaction to the siting a nuclear waste facility
in one's community. Their paper indicates that the provision of substantial compensa-
tion to residents of a host community reduces willingness to accept such a facility. The
reputation/self-respect model might speak to these results, but it is quite possible that
mechanisms described in B¶ enabou and Tirole (2003) are more germane. In that paper the
authors set up a problem in which a principal seeks to motivate an agent to take a desired
action in an environment in which the principal has better information than does the agent
about some crucial aspect of the task|for example, the cost the agent will incur if she
undertakes the task, the personal satisfaction she will experience if the task is completed
66B¶ enabou and Tirole (2006) note that the key idea|\that individuals take their actions as diagnostic
of their preferences"|is found in psychology in Bem's (1972) self-perception theory and is related to the
Festinger and Carlsmith's (1959) theory of cognitive dissonance.
67Frey and Jegen (2001) provide further reference to the literature, and discuss crowding e®ects from an
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successfully, or the likelihood that the agent will indeed successful at the task. In this
setting, the o®er of a substantial monetary reward for some action can signal \bad news"
to the agent about one of the elements of the action. Thus, if residents of a potential host
community are asked to site a nuclear waste facility and are o®ered substantial compen-
sation for doing so, that compensation might be seen as \bad news" about the eventual
consequences of the facility.
The two papers we highlight in this section of our paper, B¶ enabou and Tirole (2003 and
2006), are but two of a number of recent contributions in behavioral economics that might
form solid building blocks for a new generation of behavioral principal agency models.68
The challenge going forward is to place the psychological subtleties introduced in these
new economic models into workable (and testable) theories of ¯rm organization and labor
markets. It is important to have carefully constructed, psychologically correct models in
behavioral economics, but important also to work forward to understand the implications
of these models for the allocation of resources in markets and in society broadly.69
5.5. A Concluding Puzzle
The economic approach to agency places a primary emphasis on the use of material incen-
tives (pay, promotion, etc.) as devices to resolve principal agent problems. The economic
literature o®ers a rich and varied set of evidence in support of the critical e±cacy and impor-
tance of material incentives. The theoretical literature reinforces these empirical ¯ndings.
There are many situations in which ¯rms eschew high-powered incentives, but for the most
part this is the result of incentives having a powerful e®ect on behaviors. It is possible, as
we have seen, to construct models where extrinsic rewards undermine intrinsic motives, but
these models appear largely as elaborations and quali¯cations of the fundamental message:
68Among the many other potentially relevant examples are the models of social image in Bernheim and
Severinov (2003) and Andreoni and Bernheim (2009). The Bernheim-Severinov model is designed to explain
the common practice of equal division of bequests. The model posits that children care about the extent to
which they are loved relative to other siblings, and then studies bequests as a mechanism by which parents
can signal love. Equilibrium behavior tends to pool at equal bequest division. Similar logic might explain
the frequent organizational practice of equality in treatment (pay, work conditions, etc.) of workers who
might di®er quite widely in productivity. Andreoni and Bernheim's re¯nement of these ideas might serve
as a valuable microfoundation for studying the role of fairness (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) in principal
agent relationships.
69The beautiful work of Akerlof and his co-authors|in papers on the economic implications of reciprocal
motives, cognitive dissonance, social distance and identity|provides a template in this regard.EXTRINSIC REWARDS AND INTRINSIC MOTIVES 75
well designed extrinsic rewards are crucial to the resolution of fundamental and ubiquitous
agency problems.
Things are quite di®erent in the ¯eld of psychology. Here there has accumulated a vast
amount of evidence that extrinsic rewards actually undermine intrinsic motives.70 What
explains the di®erence?
One important part of the explanation is a cross-disciplinary di®erence in the de¯nition
of intrinsic motives. Psychologists typically view as extrinsic any sort of action undertaken
for instrumental reasons. Thus many of the pro-social and other regarding preferences we
discuss in Sections 4 and 5 would be regarded as part of an extrinsic reward system in the
psychology literature.71
Economics is concerned with the e±cient use of society's material resources. In societies
characterized by specialization and a sophisticated division of labor, almost all economic
activity involves some degree of instrumental motives. Thus by de¯ning the notion of
intrinsic rewards so narrowly, psychologist's have restricted their attention to a very small
subset of economically relevant behaviors.
The focus, as peculiar is it might appear from an economist's perspective, makes per-
fectly good sense from the perspective of psychology. After all, psychology is concerned
with understanding the reward structures that drive human behavior. Why then should
psychology privilege economically relevant motives?
70Important theoretical constructs include Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett's (1973) overjusti¯cation theory
and Deci and Ryan's (1985) self-determination theory. A large number of carefully constructed experi-
ments provide evidence favoring these theories, including many that demonstrate crowding out of intrinsic
motivation (e.g., Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 1999).
71For instance, in Ryan and Deci's (2000) taxonomy, intrinsic motivation is reserved for \the doing of an
activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable consequences." Extrinsic motivation,
on the other hand, \pertains whenever an activity is done in order to attain some separable outcome." Such
extrinsic motivation includes \external regulation" with a material reward or punishment, but also includes
\introjection," which focuses on approval from others or from oneself, and also, remarkably, \integrated
regulation," which occurs when an agent comes to assimilate the external driver as an internal driver. To
quote Ryan and Deci (2000), \The more one internalizes the reasons for an action and assimilates them to the
self, the more one's extrinsically motivated actions become self-determined. Integrated forms of motivation
share many qualities with intrinsic motivation, being both autonomous and uncon°icted. However, they
are still extrinsic because behavior motivated by integrated regulation is done for its presumed instrumental
value with respect to some outcome that is separate from the behavior, even though it is volitional and
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There is another important di®erence in the ways that psychology and economics ana-
lyze extrinsic and intrinsic motivation: the handling of autonomy. Deci, Ryan, and other
psychologists argue that feelings of autonomy and competence are fundamental to human
happiness. To the extent that they cause people to become accustomed to responding to re-
wards rather than their own intrinsic drive for self-realization, extrinsic rewards undermine
a fundamental determinant of psychological wellbeing.72
Positive economics, in contrast, conceives of autonomy simply as a means for achieving
some productive end. For example, in standard principal agent models, high levels of
autonomy are warranted when an agent has better information than does the principal
about the consequences of actions, and can be rewarded on the basis of the value created
by selecting the best action from a choice set. Even in Ellingsen and Johannesson's esteem
model, autonomy awarded by the principal serves the instrumental purpose of allowing
the agent to signal valuable information to the principal. Economists have only begun to
explore the interesting and provocative possibility that autonomy has value in and of itself
and that the use of targeted extrinsic rewards (in the psychological sense) undermines an
individual's feeling of autonomy and competence.73
6. Conclusions
Our purpose in writing this chapter is to assess the contribution of behavioral economic
ideas to the study of agency in employment relationships. In Section 2 we introduce the
basic logic of standard agency models and in Section 3 we discuss the complications that
arise when incentives must serve \double duty" as is the case where ¯rms have to worry
about adverse selection or multi-tasking. In Section 4 we introduce the core behavioral
idea of \other regarding preferences" and consider e®ects on agency relationships of various
72Deci and Ryan's theory of self-determination theory, for example, emphasizes the innate psychological
needs for a sense of competence and autonomy. The authors suggest that \interpersonal events and structures
(e.g., rewards, communications, feedback) that conduce toward feelings of competence during action can
enhance intrinsic motivation for that action because they allow satisfaction of the basic psychological need
for competence. Accordingly, for example, optimal challenges, e®ectance promoting feedback, and freedom
from demeaning evaluations are all predicted to facilitate intrinsic motivation" (Ryan and Deci, 2000).
73See, e.g., Benz and Frey's (2008) research on the value of independence and Dur and Glazer's (2008a)
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manifestations of these preferences|equity considerations, e®ort norms, norms of profes-
sional practice and identity. In Section 5 we return to the theme of double duty incentives,
and consider the possibility that incentives have the two-fold e®ect of motivating desired
behaviors while also reinforcing (or undermining) intrinsic motives.
The narrow focus of our paper has caused us to give short shrift to many important
contributions that behavioral economics has made to our discipline. We say relatively
little about such important behavioral economic topics as prospect theory, hyperbolic dis-
counting, mental accounting, status-quo biases and default rules, cognitive dissonance, or
bounded rationality. Perhaps more noteworthy than the behavioral issues we have left out
of this essay are the standard methodological approaches that we have kept in. Our inten-
tion has been to remain theoretically grounded and methodologically conservative. In each
section of the paper we represent purposive behavior by analyzing equilibrium behaviors
that emerge when individual agents maximize a utility function subject to participation con-
straints and the constraints imposed by incentive and monitoring systems. Also, consistent
with standard economic analysis, we are careful to consider the ways in which equilibrium
outcomes are shaped by market competition and by the selection of agents into employment
relationships.
Even with this deliberately conservative approach, we ¯nd that the introduction of be-
havioral features into agency models leads to novel and important results: Inequity aversion
among agents leads to lower powered incentives than would otherwise be the case, but this
e®ect can be undone in certain competitive environments. E®ort norms and \gift exchange"
can support high e®ort levels even when monitoring and incentives are problematic, but re-
liance on e®ort norms requires that principals be exquisitely attuned to the ways in which
their actions in°uence employee morale. Professional norms can have the e®ect of protecting
consumers from exploitation by professionals and this e®ect can be reinforced by properly
designed incentives. The protective value of these norms can, however, be undermined by
self-serving biases that distort the judgement of professionals in unconscious ways. Identity
matters for the resolution of agency problems within employment relationships and can help
explain important empirical anomalies in labor markets. High powered extrinsic incentives78 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
can have a corrosive e®ect on the motivation of employees, especially when the employ-
ees work in \mission driven" or \caring" organizations or when preferences or identity are
endogenously shaped by the incentives to which employees are exposed.
The application of behavioral economics to agency in employment relationships is a rela-
tively new area of research. It is worthwhile then to speculate on what might be especially
promising areas for future research. We highlight four such areas:
First, given the pivotal importance of professional norms for well functioning markets in
health care and ¯nancial services, we think it would be useful to investigate more thoroughly
the behavioral foundations of con°icts of interest. Very little is known about the ways these
con°icts shape the psychology of decision making, and having a clearer understanding of
this issue may be quite important for designing e±cient and e®ective regulatory policies.
Second, models of identity have a great deal of appeal, because families, schools, and
¯rms appear to devote enormous resources to shaping and re¯ning the identity of their
participants. As currently speci¯ed, however, models of identity are so °exible that they
may not generate falsi¯able conclusions. A satisfactory understanding of the economics of
identity will therefore require either a more structured modeling approach or, more likely,
the accumulation of additional sociological and psychological data on the nature of identity
so that the parameters of the models can be empirically constrained.
Third, much more needs to be learned about the relationship between public policy and
income and e®ort norms. Are Levy and Temin, for example, correct in their assertion
that changes in Federal government policy in the 1980's shifted the tolerance for income
inequality throughout the labor market? Are Akerlof, Dickens and Perry correct that
the e®ectiveness of monetary policy is determined by the workings of reciprocity and gift
exchange in the workplace? At present we do not have de¯nitive answers to these questions.
Finally, although the theory is new and the evidence not yet conclusive, we are in-
trigued by the notion that extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motives. In health
care, corporate governance, education, and other important settings, standard models typ-
ically prescribe some sort of of \pay for performance" for resolving agency issues. This
prescription must be greatly modi¯ed if we can identify people and contexts where high
powered ¯nancial incentives undermine employee motives to do the right thing.EXTRINSIC REWARDS AND INTRINSIC MOTIVES 79
Clearly, there is much more to discover about the behavioral economics of agency in
employment relationships.80 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
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Case 1. \Trust" Can Serve as a Signal






Case 2. Principal Must Play \Trust"100 JAMES B. REBITZER AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR




^ ve ~ ve Concern for Others (ve)
Greed (vm)
¾ No Bonus (b = 0)
Positive Bonus (b > 0),
Unadjusted for Reputation
µ
Positive Bonus (b > 0),
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